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lution 2750CI calling for a Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea to be held sometime during 1973 unless postponed
by the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly in 1972 on
grounds of insufficient progress of preparatory work. 2 Adoption
of this resolution and the initiation of preparations for the 1973 Conference has heightened interest in the question of the establishment of a legal-economic regime, and concomitant machinery, to
govern the exploration for and exploitation of the non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil beneath the high seas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction ("seabed question" hereinafter).
The issues to be dealt with at the 1973 Conference will extend far
beyond the seabed question, however, since the conference resolution identifies as potential agenda items:
[Tjhe regimes of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial
sea (including the question of its breadth and the question of international straits) and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of

the living resources of the high seas (including the question of

preferential rights of coastal States), the preservation of the marine
environment (including inter alia the prevention of pollution), and
scientific research.8

Thus, an almost limitless range of topics relating to management
of the marine environment and the exploitation of its resources
will be considered by the international community at the 1973 Conference and by the newly expanded 86 member United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction ("Seabed Committee"
Annual Meeting of the Institute on Mineral Law on January 29, 1971, and is

reprinted here by permission of the Lousiana State University Law Center.
1. G.A. Res. 2750C XXV (1970). [hereinafter cited as Conference
Resolutions]

2. The First and Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the

Sea were held in Geneva in 1958 and 1960, respectively. The 1958 Confer-

ence produced four law of the sea conventions: (1) the Convention on the
High Seas (done April'29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1962), T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82, in force Sept. 30, 1962), (2) the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606

(1964), T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, in force September 10, 1964),

(3) the Convention on the Continental Shelf (done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471 (1964), T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, in force June 10, 1964), and
(4) the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas (done April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138 (1966), T.I.A.S. No. 5969,
559 U.N.T.S. 285, in force March 20, 1966). For two of the many accounts
of that conference, see Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Seas: What Was Accomplished, 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 607 (1958) and Jessup,
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 59 CoL. L. REV. 234
(1959). The 1960 Conference is notorious for its failure to produce agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea. On that Conference, see Dean,
The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fightfor Freedom of the Seas, 54 Am. J. INTL' L. 751 (1960).

3. Conference Resolution, supra note 1, operative para. 2.
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hereinafter) beginning with preparatory conferences scheduled by
the conference resolution for March and July-August, 1971. The
General Assembly mandate requires the Seabed Committee to produce at its first two preparatory meetings in 1971 a draft convention
for a seabed regime, an agenda specifying all other topics to be dealt
with by the 1973 Conference, and draft articles on all such additional agenda items. 4 The conference resolution also specifies that
the draft seabed convention is to be prepared on the basis of the
declaration of principles on the seabed question which was also
adopted at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.5
Among the provisions of that declaration are items specifying (1)
that the seabed and its resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are the "common heritage of mankind," (2) that this area
"shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by States or
persons ... and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or
sovereign rights over any part thereof," (3) that no State or person
may claim, exercise, or acquire rights in the area unless compatible
with the international regime to be established and the other principles of the declaration, and (4) that the regime to be adopted shall

"ensure the equitable sharing by States in the benefits derived

[from seabed exploitation], taking into particular consideration the
interests and needs of the developing countries, whether landlocked or coastal."
4. Resolution 2750C instructs the Seabed Committee to:
[H] old two meetings in Geneva in March and July-August 1971
in order to prepare for the Conference draft treaty articles embodying the international regime, including an international machinery, for the area and the resources of the sea-bed and ocean
floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, taking into account the equitable sharing by all States in the
benefits to be derived therefrom, bearing in mind the special interests and needs of developing countries, whether coastal or landlocked, on the basis of the Declaration of Principles Governing
the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and the Sub-soil thereof beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1970; and a comprehensive list of subjects
and issues relating to the law of the sea referred to in operative
paragraph 2 hereof which should be dealt with by the conference,
and draft articles on such subjects and issues.
In the United States, the Department of State is charged with responsibility for preparation, negotiation, and representation of this Nation at the
1973 Conference. The Office of the Legal Adviser for Ocean Affairs, under
the direction of Assistant Legal Adviser for Ocean Affairs Bernard H. Oxman, carries primary responsibility for this effort within the State Department.
5. G.A. Res. 2749, XXV (1970).

Prior to adoption of these resolutions by the General Assembly,
the United States delegation to the August, 1970, session of the Seabed Committee in Geneva tabled a proposed draft convention on
the seabed question, entitled "Draft United Nations Convention on
the International Seabed Area"6 which, because of its quality and
comprehensiveness is likely to be the model from which the Seabed
Committee will construct its draft convention. Accordingly, it is
appropriate to review briefly the events concerning the seabed
question which led the United States Government to prepare and
submit the Draft Convention, to describe the functional provisions
of the document, and to make some preliminary appraisal of its
value in serving national, international, and industry interests.
Part II of this paper deals with background material, covering
relevant aspects of marine geology and marine resources law, a
short history of the seabed question from August, 1967 to date, the
genesis and substance of the Nixon statement of May 23, 1970, and
the Draft Convention. Part III summarizes the salient provisions
of the Draft Convention and makes some preliminary analytical
comments concerning several of those provisions. Part IV is devoted to a brief resume of national, international, and industry interests served by the document.
I-. BAcKGROUND

In order to view the Draft Convention in proper perspective, it is
necessary to understand three aspects of the seabed question: (1)
the physical characteristics of the marine areas under consideration, (2) the existing legal-economic regimes governing disposition
of resources in these areas, and (3) the recent history of efforts to
secure adoption of a regime to govern resource disposition in the
area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
6. U. N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/25; 9 INT'L LE(AL MATERIALS 1046 (1970).
See Draft U.N. Convention on the International Seabed Area: U.S. Working
Paper Submitted to U.N. Seabeds Committee, 63 DEP'T STATE BuLL 209
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention] which includes a concise
summary of the provisions of the Draft Convention as well as statements
thereon by Department of State Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson and
United States U.N. Representative Christopher H. Phillips.
The document contains a caveat on the cover specifying that it was submitted to the Seabed Committee as "a working paper for discussion purposes," and that it and its appendices "raise a number of questions with
respect to which further detailed study is clearly necessary and do not
necessarily represent the definitive views of the United States Government." This caveat may in part have been included in the final version
of the draft as a response to a letter of objection transmitted to Secretary
of State Rogers by four members of the U.S. Senate prior to the August,
1970, meeting of the Seabed Committee.

Draft U.N. Convention
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

A.

The Continental Shelf and Deep Seabed-Marine Geology And
Marine Resources Law.

The seabed and subsoil of the world ocean, the non-living resources of which are the subject of both the Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Draft Convention, 7 is not a uniform phenomenon but rather is composed of several distinct geomorphological features changing in characteristics as one moves seaward. To suggest that the general features of these areas are distinct is not to
imply that the lines of demarcation between them are distinct, for
such is not the case, and therein lies much of the difficulty in de-

limiting zones of offshore jurisdiction. As is well known, the legal
definition of the continental shelf contained in the Convention on
the Continental Shelf varies considerably from the geological definition of the shelf. A quick review of geologic seabed phenomena
and the present legal regime governing resource disposition therefrom is thus in order.
1.

Marine Geology.

a. The Continental Shelf. The continental shelf is the seaward
portion of the extension of the continental land mass which begins
with the upland coastal plain and extends seaward until a marked
7. The Draft Convention also covers the subject of living resources of
the seabed:
Subject to the provisions of Chapter III [the International Trusteeship Area], each Contracting Party may explore and exploit the
seabed living resources of the International Seabed Area in accordance with such conservation measures as are necessary to protect
the living resources of the International Seabed Area and to maximize their growth and utilization. Art. 22.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into the debate on the legaleconomic regime to govern exploitation of "sedentary species" or "seabed
living resources" and, accordingly, the article deals only with the non-living
resources of the seabed. See Examination of Living Resources Associated
with the Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf with Regard to the Nature and
Degree of their Physical and Biological Association with Such Sea Bed,
memorandum prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/13; 1 U.N. CoNFERENCE ON THE LAw
or THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS 187 (1958); Goldie, Sedentary Fisheries and

Article 2(4) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf-A Plea for a
Separate Regime, 63 Amv. J. INT'L L. 86 (1969); Oda, A Reconsideration of
the Continental Shelf Doctrine, 32 TuL. L. REV. 21 (1957); Oda, Proposals
for Revising the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 7 COLUm. J. TRAN's.
L. 1, 10-18 (1968); Young, Sedentary Fisheries and the Convention on the
ContinentalShelf, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 359 (1961).

increase in slope occurs.8 Although the continental shelf actually
consists of the entire continental structure beginning at approximately the 600 foot contour above sea level, only the submerged
portion is of interest to those concerned with marine resources, and
the term has come generally to refer only to that submerged portion.9 The average water depth at the break in slope was traditionally considered to be 200 meters 0 although in fact this average
depth is approximately 72 fathoms or 130-140 meters." This average figure may be somewhat misleading, however, since there are
few places in the world where the 72 fathom or 130-140 meter isobath actually coincides with the shelf edge.' 2 Rather, the shelf edge
varies from water depths of 20 to 550 meters.'8 The average slope
8. The International Committee on Nomenclature of the Sea Floor sug-

gested in 1953 the following definition of the shelf:
The zone around the continent, extending from the low-water line
to a depth at which there is a marked increase of slope to greater
depth.
1 SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 183 (1962) notes:

[The continental shelf] may be defined as the submerged portion
of a continent, which slopes gently seaward from the low-water

line to the point where a substantial break in grade occurs, at
which point the bottom slopes seaward at a considerable increase
in slope until the great ocean depths are reached.
Emery, An Oceanographer's View of the Law of Sea, in PROCEEDINGS
THE SYmPOSIUm ON THE INTERNATIONAL REGImEE OF THE SEA-BED

OF

47, 53-54

(Sztucki Ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Emery, Rome Symposium]; See
also Hedberg, ContinentalMargins from Viewpoint of the Petroleum Geologist, 54 Am. AsSN. PETRO. GEO. BULL. 3, 6 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Hedberg].
9. See Franklin, The Law of the Sea: Some Recent Developments, 53
NAy. WAR COLL. Bt. BK. SEn. 16 (1961).
10. See for example, 1 SHALowrrz, supra note 8 at 246. The International
Committee on Nomenclature of the Sea Floor stated in 1953 that "[con-

ventionally, the [shelf] edge is taken at 100 fathoms (or 200 meters) ...."
This practice stemmed at least in part from the fact that early nautical
charts contained only the 10, 100, and 1000 fathom isobaths, the 100
fathom line most closely approximating water depth above the seaward
edge of the continental shelf. Emery, The Continental Shelves, in THE
OCEAN (edited by the Scientific American Magazine) 41 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Emery, Scientific American]; Franklin, supra note 9, at 12.
11. SHEPRU, THE ETH.BENEATH THE SEA 81; Emery, Scientific American,
supra note 10, at 41; Emery, Rome Symposium, supra note 8, at 53; Guilcher, The Configuration of the Ocean Floor and its Subsoil: Geopolitical
Implications, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYmpOsium ON THE INTERNATIONAL
REGIME oF THE SEA-;BED 3, 4 (Sztucki ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Guilcher]; Hedberg, supra note 8, at 6.
12. SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 61 (observing that only rarely does the
shelf edge occur at the 100 fathom isobath).
13. Emery, Scientific American, supra note 10, at 41. See also the following: Guilcher, supra note 11, at 4 "[The shelf break] varies considerably and reaches exceptionally 300 fathoms, or 550 meters, or even more,
around Antarctica." Hedberg, supra note 8, at 6-7 "[T]he range of water
depths at this edge is from only a few meters to more than 600 m. in such
places as the Arctic Ocean off Canada and the Ross Sea in the Antarctic."
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of the shelf is given as 00 07', or about ten feet per mile,14 and the
average water depth over continental shelves as 30 fathoms. 15 The
width of the continental shelf also varies substantially, ranging
from virtually zero breadth off the western coast of South America
to 800 miles or more beneath the Bering Sea, averaging approximately 40 miles in width world-wide. 16 In the United States, shelf
width varies from as little as one mile off portions of California, to
100-150 miles off the Gulf coast, to over 200 miles off New England. 17 The area of world continental shelves, based on a 200
supra note 11, at 81 "The shelves are deepest off glaciated areas
although there are a few deep shelves elsewhere, for example, off Southwest Africa. The shelves are shoalest in areas with extensive coral growth
and along unglaciated Siberia where it faces the Arctic ocean."
14. S=rPARD, supra note 11, at 81.
SHEPAmR,

15. Id. at 79.

16. Id. at 81 "The shelves are widest in the Arctic and along the north

and west sides of the Pacific from the Bering Sea to Australia. The shelves

are narrowest off young mountain ranges where numerous earthquakes

indicate that intensive faulting is still taking place." See also the following: 1 SEHAEowrrz, supra note 8, at 183-85; Emery, Scientific American,
supra note 10, at 41 "[T]he shelf ranges in width from 0 to 1500 kilometers, with an average of 78 Kilometers." Guilcher, supra note 11, at 4
"[A] s a rule [the shelf] is widest in areas where the emerged relief is low,
as off northwestern Europe, eastern North America, southeastern South
America, and northwestern Australia; it is narrowest in form of subaerial
mountains, as off western North and South America." Hedberg, supra
note 8, at 6 "Among the world's most extensive shelves are those of the
Arctic Ocean off Siberia, the Bering Sea off Alaska, the coast of China, and
the Arafura Sea off Australia, as well as the Sunda Shelf of Indonesia, the
Atlantic shelf off Argentina, the shelf off eastern Canada, and the northwestern European shelf."
Among states leading in area of continental shelf are the Soviet Union
(1,324,000 square miles), Canada (926,800 square miles), the United States
(860,600 square miles), Australia (827,500 square miles), Indonesia (503,120
square miles), Argentina (331,000 square miles) and Brazil (264,800 square
miles) [from MARnE SCIENCE AFr'As-A
TION 16 (1969), data based on a shelf

YEAR OF BROADENED PARTICIPA-

edge at 200 meters water depth].
17. 1 SHALowrrz, supra note 8, at 184. There are a number of excellent
small scale maps available which indicate the width of the continental
shelf and other features of the seabed, although most are drawn on the
basis of equating the shelf edge with the 200 meter isobath. The National
Geographic Society ocean floor map series (Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian
Oceans) are excellent for all aspects of seabed configurations. An outstanding map prepared by Bruce C. Heezen (Lamont-Doherty Geological
Observatory, Columbia University) and Marie Tharp (U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office) entitled Major Topographic Divisions of the Continental
Margins is also valuable for visualizing sea floor phenomena. See also the
physiographic diagrams of the North Atlantic, South Atlantic. and Indian

meter isobath shelf edge, is generally given as 7.5-7.6 percent of the
ocean floor area.' 8 Classification of continental shelf types and descriptions of their origins are beyond the scope of this review, but
may be found elsewhere.19 The surface of the shelf shows some degree of topographical relief, including canyons (extending from
the coast seaward) and parallel trenches. Most shelf areas are covered by a relatively thick layer of various types of unconsolidated
sediment reaching depths of five kilometers, 20 although areas exist
without sediment. 21 According to K. 0. Emery, "[c]ontinental
shelves are characterized by structure and stratigraphy that are
similar to, or are natural continuations of, the structure and stratigraphy of the adjacent land."22 It is therefore not surprising that
some mineral deposits found in upland locations are also found on
and beneath the continental shelves. Some of the resources, such
as fish2 3 and manganese nodules are, of course, unique to the shelf
environment (vis-a-vis the upland), but large deposits of petroleum
and natural gas are also present beneath shelves underlain by consolidated sedimentary strata.24 This area also is exploited to a lesser
extent for sand and gravel, ilmenite, rutile, zircon, tin, monazite,
2 5
iron, gold, and diamonds.
Oceans prepared by Bruce C. Heezen and Marie Tharp, published by the
Geological Society of America, Inc.
18. Emery, Scientific American, supra note 10, at 42; Guilcher, supra
note 11, at 5; Hedberg, supra note 8, at 6.
19. See e.g., the discussion in SHEPARm,
supra note 11, at 66-79, 83-93.
See also KING, AN INTRODUCTION TO OCEANOGRAPHY 54-63 (1966) [hereinafter cited as KNG].
20. SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 62-63 (classifies principal shelf sediments
as (1) sands [terrigerous (physical), calcarentie (organic), and authigenic
(chemical)], (2) mud (silt, clay), and (3) gravel). See also Emery, Rome
Symposium, supra note 8, at 54; Guilcher, supra note 11, at 5-8; and Hedberg, supra note 8, at 8.
21. SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 64.

22. Emery, Geological Aspects of Sea-Floor Sovereignty, THE LAW OF
OFFsHoRE BOUNDARmS AND ZoNEs 139, 148 (Alexander ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Emery, LAw oF T=n SiA]. See also Emery, Scientific
American, supra note 10, passim.
23. Emery, Scientific American, supra note 10, at 52 observes that "about
90% of the world's marine food resources, now extracted at the rate of $8
billion per year, comes from the shelves and adjacent bays."
24. Wenk, The Physical Resources of the Ocean, THE OcEAN (edited by
the Scientific American Magazine) 83, 85 (1970) notes:
Oil and gas represent more than 90 percent by value of all minerals obtained from the oceans and have the greatest potential for
the near future. Offshore sources are responsible for 17 percent of
the oil and 6 percent of the natural gas produced by nonCommunist countries....
Subsea oil and gas are now produced
or are about to be produced by 28 countries; another 50 are engaged
in exploratory surveys.
All of this resource production takes place, as of this writing, in water
depths less than 130-140 meters. See also Guilcher, note 4 supra, at 9-11.
25. Emery, Scientific American, supra note 10, at 52. See also Wenk,
THE SEA:
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b. The Continental Slope. The continental slope lies seaward
of the continental shelf and has recently been the object of a great
deal of scientific and political speculation as a result of proposals
to extend exclusive coastal state jurisdiction over seabed resources
to the outer edge of the slope or continental margin. The term
"continental margin" refers generally to the area of seabed including a seaward portion of the shelf, all of the slope, and a landward
portion of the continental rise, excluding the ocean basin. 26 The
continental slope may be defined as the area of seabed extending
from the outer margin of the continental shelf to, in the absence of
a continental rise, the oceanic abyss. 2 7

It has been described as:

supra note 24, at 87 who observes:
Seventy percent of the world's continental shelves consist of ancient unconsolidated sediments from which are dredged such commodities as sand, gravel, oyster shell, tin, heavy-mineral sands and
diamonds.... So far [dredging] has been limited to nearshore
waters less than 235 feet deep and protected from severe weather
effects.
See also Guilcher, supra note 11, at 9-11. A complete chart of the annual
value of exploited mineral resources of the ocean floor beyond the
beach zone appears in Emery, Rome Symposium, supra note 8, at 48.
26. Hedberg, supra note 8, at 3 observes:
I would prefer not to restrict [the term "continental margin"] to
prescise limits, but to let it simply indicate a broad geomorphicgeologic zone, of rather indefinite extent, encompassing the contact
of the continental masses with the ocean basins. Geomorphically,
it would center on the continental slope, but would also include
the seaward part of the submerged continental shelf and the landward part of the continental rise. Geologically, it would include
the zone of lateral change in the lithosphere marking the oceanward limits of typical continental crust.
Cf. Guilcher, supra note 11, at 4:
The continental margin is a submarine apron which runs around
the continents and includes the shelf, or shallow platform, the
slope beginning at the outer edge of the shelf, and the rise or lower
slope down to the deep sea floor.
The term continental margin is not yet one of precise definition, and this
paper will therefore reflect only the traditional divisions of offshore geology, viz.: the shelf, slope, rise, and ocean floor.
27. SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 95. Emery, Rome Symposium, supra note
8, at 54 suggested, with others, the following definition of the slope:
The zone bordering the continental shelf that extends seaward
from the shelf edge at declivities that average about 414 degrees
down to depths of 1,200 to 3,500 meters. Its outer edge approximately marks the boundary between the low density rocks of the
continents and the high density ones of the deep ocean floor or the
intermediate ones of the enclosed or marginal seas.
Hedberg, supra note 8, at 11 states:
The continental slope is a worldwide feature representing the
frontal edge of the continental platform-the descent from the
general level of the top of this platform, within a few hundred

[T]he greatest topographic feature on the face of the earth, an escarpment 3-1/2 km. high and over 350,000 km. in length, which is in
turn the surface expression of the greatest structural discontinuity
earth's surface, the transition from continental to oceanic
on the
28
crust.

The seaward limit of the slope is ill-defined, but is conventionally

taken as the point where the change in gradient from the steep
banked slope to the ocean floor reaches less than 1:40.29 The water
depth at the seaward extent averages 2500 meters, the range run-

ning from less than 1000 meters to more than 4000 meters.80 As a
result of an average declivity of 4 07',81 the width of the continental

slope extends from 15 to 50 kilometers. 82 The area of the slope has
been placed at 8.5 percent of the area beneath the oceans.8 8 Slopes,
like shelves, are overlain by unconsolidated sedimentary deposits
composed principally of mud, sand, and gravel, with the mud/sand
ratio being higher than on shelves.8 4 Attempting to characterize
slope types would also be beyond the scope of this brief summary 8
and it should suffice to note that although slopes, like shelves, contain irregularities, slopes are continuous between the shelf and the
deep ocean floor with the exception of intermediate terraces or
series of basins and ridges.8 6 These intermediate terraces are commonly referred to as continental borderlands or plateaus, the most
notable off the United States coast being the Blake Plateau from
which manganese nodules have recently been recovered, 8 7 which
meters of sea level, to the general level of the ocean deeps, at
about 5,000 m. below sea level.
28. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, Opportunities and
Problems in Marine Geology and Geophysics, 3 MAuqx GEOLOGY 227, 234
(1965).
29. Hedberg, supra note 8, at 15; Emery, Law of the Sea, supra note 22,
at 150.
30. Guilcher, supranote 11, at 5; SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 110.
31. SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 110. Shepard indicates a range in declivity from 1 20' to 50 40' although noting that isolated instances the slope
can be much greater. Hedberg, supra note 8, at 11 indicates an average
inclination of 20 to 6' with extremes of 27° - 350 off the west coast of
Florida, 400 at the edge of the Bahama platform, and in excess of 450
south of Ceylon.
32. Hedberg, supra note 8, at 11.
33. Guilcher, supra note 11, at 5.
34. SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 111.
35. For details, see KING, supra note 19, at 49-54; SHEPHAiR, supra note 11,
at 96-114; Guilcher, supra note 11, at 8-11; and Hedberg, supra note 8, at
11-16.
36. SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 96; Hedberg, supra note 8, at 8-11.
37. On this mineral recovery operation and the techniques utilized
therein, see Kaufman and Rothstein, Recent Developments in Deep Ocean
Mining, paper delivered at the Sixth Annual Marine Technology Society
Meeting (1970); Flipse, Developments in Ocean Exploration and Mining,
paper delivered to the 1969 Mining Convention, American Mining Congress
(1969); Flipse, An Engineering Approach' to Ocean Mining, paper pre-
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lies at depths of 500-1100 meters, and which has an area of approximately 200,000 square kilometers. 8 There is growing evidence
that many natural resources, including hydrocarbons and surficial
hard mineral deposits, occur on portions of the slope in quantities
comparable to those occurring on the shelf. The potential of continental borderlands and plateaus especially for economic hydro3
carbon and hard mineral recovery in the relatively near future sa
has enhanced the feeling of urgency surrounding efforts to secure
adoption of a legal-economic regime to govern exploitation of such
resources in the interests of all mankind as opposed to extension of
exclusive coastal state jurisdiction to cover these areas.
c. The Continental Rise. The continental rise exists in situations where the steep portion of the continental slope is terminated
on its seaward edge by a gentle slope which may extend for substantial distances into the deep-ocean basins. 39 This sedimental strucsented to First Annual Offshore Technology Conference (1969).
Other important marginal plateaus, indicated by Hedberg, supra note 8,
at 9, include "the Falkland Plateau, the marginal plateaus off Brazil, the
Iberian Plateau, the Voring Plateau off Norway, the Umnak Plateau in the
Bering Sea, the Campbell Plateau east of New Zealand, and the Exmouth,
Naturaliste, and Coral Sea Plateaus flanking the Australian continent."
38. Hedberg, supra note 8, at 9.
38a. The question of when to expect commercial production of non-living
seabed resources beyond the 200 meter isobath has received widely varying
answers. Estimates of the amount of such activity to be expected in the
near-term have tended lately to be conservative as compared to circa 1967
estimates. For example, Francis T. Christy of Resources for the Future,
Inc. noted in December, 1970: "[It does not appear that there will be
significant development of sea-bed resources in the areas beyond the 200
meter isobath during the next decade or two." Christy, Economic Problems and Prospects for Exploitation of the Resources of the Sea-Bed and
its Subsoil, paper presented to Symposium on the Exploration and Exploitation of the Sea-Bed and Its Subsoil, The Council of Europe, Strasbourg,
December 3-5, 1970. This indicates, according to Christy, a lack of economic
motivation for establishing a seabed regime at this time. However, other
factors (principally political and national security, but including the simple
fact that it may take 10-12 years to bring such a treaty into force) suggest
the need for initiating negotiations now on this subject.
39. SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 95. Shepard comments further:
This outer slope is referred to as the continental rise or locally as
a deep-sea fan. It is not only much less inclined than the inner
slope, but it is also much smoother topographically. Accordingly
it seems wise to confine the term continental slope to the steeper
portions and to consider the apron as a part of the deepsea floor.
Id. at 95.
Deep-sea fans are gently sloping, sediment-covered plains that
border the continental slopes in many places. Id. at 142.

ture creates a significant problem in some instances in locating the
actual edge of the continental formation since it may overlie deep
ocean structures at its seaward edge. Accordingly, determination of
the "edge of the continental margin" is more difficult to ascertain
than the edge of the continental shelf, these being the two boundaries utilized in the regime proposed by the Draft Convention. 40 The rise occurs on the landward side in water depths ranging from 1200 meters to 3500 meters and on the seaward side from
3500 meters to 5500 meters. 41 The area of the continental rise is
about 5 percent of the total ocean bottom,4 2 has an average slope of

approximately one-half degree,43 and may extend to a width of
1000 kilometers.44 Detailed discussions of the characteristics of the
rise may be found elsewhere 45 but for purposes of this paper it will
be sufficient to note the sedimentary nature of the formation, its
overlap of the actual boundary between the continental land mass
and the oceanic crust, and the fact that hydrocarbons may be found
4
in the area. 5a

d. The Abyssal Plain. Beyond the continental rise lies the
abyssal plain or ocean basin. Actually, the abyssal plain is but one
Hedberg, supra note 8, at 16 states:
The continental rise is the apron of sediments that slopes
gently oceanward from the base of the continental slope, generally
through a water-depth range of 2,000-5,000 m.
40. As will be noted, however, the Draft Convention contains unique
boundary determination provisions which ameliorate much of the difficulty inherent in having to locate precisely these geologic boundaries.
41. Emery, Rome Symposium, supra note 8, at 53. Emery, LAw oF Tm
SEA, supra note 22, at 151 notes that the edge of the rise may be defined as
the point where there is a change in slope to gentler than 1:1,000. See
also Guilcher, supra note 11, at 5; and Hedberg, supra note 8, at 16.
42. Emery, Rome Symposium, supra note 8, at 54 indicates that the
volume of rise sediments may be 100 million cubic kilometers.
43. Emery, Rome Symposium, supra note 8, at 53.
44. Hedberg, supra note 8, at 16.
45. See Knmc, supra note 19, at 49-54; Emery, Rome Symposium, supra
note 8, at 54; and Hedberg, supranote 8, at 16.
45a. It has been observed that:
There is increasing expectation that the continental rise .
will prove to have sizable oil deposits. Because of high costs of
drilling and producing oil in deep waters, such operations may be
unprofitable.

Fortunately, the sedimentary thicknesses suitable for the entrap-

ment of oil are known to be unusually great in many regions of the
continental rise. This could lead to very large oil fields, reducing
discovery and production costs per barrel of recoverable oil.
Statement of Dr. Miller B. Spangler, Director, Center for Techno-Economic Studies, National Planning Association, Hearings before the Special
Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on Issues Related to Establishment of Seaward
Boundary of United States Outer Continental Shelf, Part 2, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., 299, 301 (1970).
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phenomenon occurring in the ocean basin, but it is the predominant
feature and thus is often used to characterize the entire area.
Emery suggested the following definition for the ocean basins:
"The two-thirds of the Earth's surface that form the floor of the
deep oceans characterized by high density rocks." 4 6 Guilcher explains the phenomenon as follows:
Abyssal plains and hills are a unit extending approximately between 3,000 and 6,000 meters, although these limits may be regionally exceeded upward and downward. They occupy oceanic
basins. The plains are flat-bottomed and their slope is less than
1:1,000. They alternate with hills where the topography is gently
undulated, the height of the hills ranging from a few fathoms to a
few hundred feet. Isolated hills also rise in the abyssal plains.
These features are located between the base of the continental rise
47
and the midoceanic ridge....

Emery characterizes the abyssal plain as follows:
Abyssal plains consist of sediments whose layers are variously
formed by slow deposition from suspension, fast deposition by
turbidity currents, and probably intermediate-rate deposition by
organic debris and chemical48precipitates. The total thickness is
only a few hundred meters, and probably the only minerals of
potential economic value are within manganese nodules. These
nodules are most abundant on abyssal plains that are protected
detrital sediment from land by intervening
from the influx of
49
trenches or ridges.

The deep ocean floor is also characterized by a number of other
significant geologic formations, including seamounts, trenches,
channels, canyons, and ridges.
Seamounts are "isolated sea-floor elevations rising 3,000 feet or
46. Emery, Rome Symposium, supra note 8, at 53.
47. Guilcher, supra note 11, at 12.
48. For a discussion of the thickness of abyssal plain sediments, see
SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 176-77.
49. Emery, Rome Symposium, supra note 8, at 55. For a discussion of the
various types of abyssal plain sedimentation, see Guilcher, supra note 11,
at 13-17. See also SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 160-69, and Wenk, supra
note 24, at 87, 88 where it is noted that:
The only known minerals on the floor of the deep ocean that appear to be of potential economic importance are the well-publicized
manganese nodules, formed by the precipitation from seawater of
manganese oxides and other mineral salts, usually on a small nucleus such as a bit of stone or a shark's tooth. These are widely
distributed, with concentrations of 31,000 tons per square mile on
the floor of the Pacific Ocean. Although commonly found at
depths greater than 12,500 feet, nodules exist in 1,000 feet of water
on the Blake Plateau off the southeastern U.S. and were located
last year at a depth of 200 feet in the Great Lakes.

more above their surroundings. If these mountains have flat tops,
they are called guyots, or tablemounts.5 °
Trenches are simply what the name implies, that is, long, narrow, and relatively steep sided depressions in the ocean floor.51
The continental slope edge is, for almost one-half its length, margined by deep sea trenches which in some instances are filled with
2
sediments and may even be overlain by continental rises.
Channels and Canyons. Guilcher observes with respect to these
features:
These elongated depressions resembling big river beds are much
flatter than the canyons cutting through the continental slope.
They do not exceed some tens of meters in relative depth, but may
extend for more than 2,000 kilometers 53in length. They are commonly bordered by levees on both sides.

Ridges. The midoceanic ridge is probably the most interesting recent discovery in marine geology. These ridges circle the globe and
are apparently caused by upwelling of magma which then slowly
spreads out across the sea floor, giving motion to the giant plates of4
5
oceanic crust in the phenomenon known as "sea floor spreading."
2. Marine Resources Law
Given this introduction to the nature of the seabed, it is now appropriate to outline briefly the status of those legal zones of jurisdiction in the ocean which are of importance to the exploration and
exploitation of non-living seabed resources.
a. The Territorial Sea. The territorial sea is a zone of ocean
space 55 adjacent to coastal states over which the coastal state, with
50. SHEPARU, supra note 11, at 140-42. For discussions of this phenomenon, see KING, supra note 19, at 69-72;
and Guilcher, supranote 11, at 25-27.

51.

SHEPARD,

SHEPARD,

supra note 11, at 151-54;

supra note 11, at 142.

52. Hedberg, supra note 8, at 16. Discussions of trench characteristics
may be found in KNG, supra note 19 at 38-43; SHEPARD, supra note 11, at
147-50; Guilcher, supra note 11, at 23-25; and Hedberg, supra note 8, at 16.
See also Fisher and Revelle, The Trenches of the Pacific, Sci=umc
AarEnucAw, Nov., 1955.
53. Guilcher, supra note 11, at 13. See also Kinm, supra note 19, at 64-69;
SHEPARD, supra note 11, at 115-38; Hedberg, supra note 8, at 16-22; and
Heezen, The Origin of Submarine Canyons, ScmNTcic AMERiCAN, Aug.,
1956.
54. For detailed explanations of this phenomenon, see Bullard, The Origin of the Oceans, THE OcE N (edited by Scientific American Magazine)
at 15, and Menard, The Deep Ocean Floor, THE OcENs
(edited by Scientific American Magazine) at 53. See also KING, supra note 19, at 43-49;
Guilcher, supra note 11, at 18-23; and Heirtzler, Sea-Floor Spreading, Sci-

EN-c

AmrEicA,

Dec., 1968.

55. The term "ocean space" is used to refer to the entire range of vertical
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the exception of the rights of innocent passage and entry in distress, exercises absolute territorial sovereignty, including sovereignty in the airspace above the ocean, the water column, and the
seabed and subsoil below the ocean waters.5 6 The breadth of this
belt of exclusive jurisdiction was established during the 18th and
19th centuries by the general practice of Western European nations
at 3 geographical miles, but this doctrine has received substantial
challenges in recent decades with claims of 6, 12, and even 200 miles
being made by coastal states. 57 No international agreement has
been reached on the breadth of the territorial sea5 8 but it is clear
stratifications which can be made of the marine environment, viz., (1) subsoil, (2) seabed, (3) water column, (4) surface, and (5) atmosphere. The
legal regimes established in ocean space often relate, in a particular geographic area, to less than all of these five areas. For instance, the legal
regime of continental shelf as set forth in the Convention of the Continental
Shelf gives rights only in the seabed and subsoil, with limited rights to use
water column space for installations necessary to the exercise of the other
rights granted, but confers no sovereignty or other form of jurisdiction
over the water column, surface, or atmosphere. Further, the rights granted
in the seabed and subsoil under the continental shelf doctrine are for the
limited purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources located there,
and for no other purpose. Thus, in analyzing any legal regime for ocean
space, one must ascertain (1) the geographic area covered by the zone, (2)
the vertical strata included in the regime, and (3) the specific uses permitted within the area and strata.
56. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra
note 2, provides:
The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and
its internal waters to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea. [Art. 11
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the air space over
the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. [Art. 21
57. Of the 109 states for which information is listed in the latest tabulation available from the Department of State, 35 states claim 3 or 4 miles;
13 states claim 6 to 10 miles; 51 states claim 12 miles; 4 states claim more
than 12 but less than 200 miles: and 6 states claim 200 miles. Thus, 43
percent of states claim 6 miles or less, while 57 percent claim 12 miles or
more. This data evidences a clear trend toward the mile limit from days
when the 3 mile limit was the subject of virtual unanimity among members of the international community.
58. The 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which
produced four law of the sea conventions (see supra note 2) was unable to
agree on a breadth, and the relevant convention provides only that:
The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of
which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal
to the breadth of the territorial sea. [Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Art. 61.
The 1960 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea also (but narrowly) failed to agree on a territorial sea breadth. See Dean, The Second

that whatever the breadth accepted or ultimately recognized, the
coastal state has the exclusive right to explore for and exploit the
natural resources located anywhere in the zone. 50 In 1970, the
United States indicated its willingness to have the breadth of the
territorial sea fixed at twelve miles, provided that this could be
done by an international agreement, that agreement could be
reached on the problem of preferential fishing rights for coastal
states, and that free passage through international straits could be
guaranteed.6 0
b. The Continental Shelf. Initiated by the Truman Proclamation of 194561 by which the United States asserted jurisdiction over
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil adjacent to the coasts of
this Nation to approximately the 600 foot isobath, the international
legal doctrine of the continental shelf (which, in its simplest form,
asserts that every coastal state possesses some rights to exploit natural resources from some area of seabed off its coasts) was codified in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf which defined
the shelf area as:
[T]he seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200
meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the
said areas. 62
Within this area each coastal state may exercise exclusive sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 63

In its decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International Court of Justice observed that the doctrine of the continental shelf had become customary international law:
[Tjhe most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the continental shelf [is] that the rights of the coastal state in respect of
the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and
ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the
Seas, 52 Amw. J. INr'i. L. 607 (1958).
59. See Art. 2 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 56.
60. Stevenson, InternationalLaw and the Oceans, 62 DLT'T STATE BULL.
339 (1970). See also U.S. Outlines Position on Limit of TerritorialSea, 62
DFXaT STATE BuLL. 343 (1970) and United States Policy with Respect to Territorial Seas, Department of Defense Press Release, Feb. 25, 1970.
61. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R., 1943-1948 Comp., at 67 (1945); 13
DEP'T STATE BuLL. 485 (Sept. 30, 1945).
62. Convention on the Continental Shelf supranote 2, Art. 1.
63. Id., Art. 2.
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64
exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources.

Substantial debate has taken place concerning the seaward extent
of the continental shelf under the convention definition in view of
the concepts of "adjacency," "200 meters," and "exploitability," two
of which are quite subjective. 65 The issue has been further confused by the above quoted dicta in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases. The urging of some that the definition could be interpreted
to extend coastal state shelf jurisdiction to the edge of the continental margin 6 has given an added sense of urgency to the efforts
of those who would maximize the area of seabed to be exploited for
the benefit of all mankind. Whatever the shelf width ultimately
agreed upon, either by new agreement or by interpretation of the
existing Convention provisions, it is clear that the coastal state will
have an exclusive right to explore for and exploit the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil within the area subject to its jurisdiction.

64. North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 22. The statement
must be considered as dicta since the dispute at bar concerned establishment of lateral boundaries and not the question whether the states involved in the litigation had particular rights in offshore areas vel non.
Its accuracy, however, is open to little doubt, although the question of its
relevance or applicability to states party to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, which utilizes a different definition of the extent of the shelf,
is questionable.
65. For various interpretations of the shelf width provisions of the Convention, see Study Preparedby the Secretariat of the United Nations for the
Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,U. N. Doc. A/AC. 135/19,
paras. 11-38 (1968); Alexander, Alternative Regimes for the Continental
Shelf, Preparatory Conference on the Legal Framework and Continental
Shelf, Pacem in Maribus Convocation (1970); and Brown, The Outer Limit
of the ContinentalShelf, 1968 Jumn. REv. 111 (1968).
66. See, e.g., Hedberg, Limits of National Jurisdiction over Natural Resources of the Ocean Bottom, TnE LAw Or T= SnA: NATIONAL POLICY
REcOma-mENDAnoNs 159 (Alexander ed. 1970); Jennings, The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible Implications of the North Sea
Case Judgment, 18 INT'L & Comvip. L. Q. 819 (1969); Petroleum Resources
Under the Ocean Floor, National Petroleum Council (1969) 61-63. See also
Statement of Northcutt Ely, Esq., on behalf of the American Bar Association, in Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials,and Fuels
of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on Issues Related
to Establishment of Seaward Boundary of United States Outer Continental
Shelf and Related Matter, Including S.3970 to Amend the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970, at 2 [hereinafter cited as
Ely Statement].

c. The High Seas.' Beyond the seaward limit of the territorial
sea lie the high seas, being comprised of the water column. The
concept of the freedom of the high seas, as embodied in the Convention on the High Seas, permits the use of the seabed, surface, water
column, and atmosphere for the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, navigation, fishing, and overflight, respectively.07 Neither the Convention on the High Seas nor the rules of customary
international law, however, specify what regime is applicable to the
exploitation of natural resources of the seabed and subsoil beneath
the high seas but (necessarily) outside the legal continental shelf.
Although it has been argued that in the absence of special agreement, these resources partake of the same treatment as the living
resources in the superjacent waters (that is, that they are res
Yullius, appropriable by the first to reduce them to possession) ,e7a
most authorities agree that this area is at present without any
meaningful legal regime, even though little could be done to affect
individual mining operations, 68 and that the field is ripe for a de
novo regime which would give effect to whatever national or international policies might be agreed upon.
This, then, constitutes the scientific and legal setting for the ef67. Article 2 of the Convention provides:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may .validly
purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these
articles and by other rules of international law. It comprises,
inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general
principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States m their exercise
of the freedom of the high seas.
67a. See, e.g., Brock, Mineral Resources and the Future Development of
the InternationalLaw of the Sea, 22 JAG J. 39, 42-43 (1967); Ely, American
Policy Options in the Development of Undersea Mineral Resources, 2
INT'L LArvR 215, 222-23 (1968); Flipse and Greenwald, The Marine Operator's Role in the Rational Formulation of Principles of Law Governing
Mining Activities in 'Shared' Ocean Space, Marine Technology Society, 6th
Annual Conference Preprints at 573, 575-76 (1970); Wilkey, The Deep
Ocean: Its Potential Mineral Resources and Problems, 3 INT'L LAWYiR 31,
45-46 (1968).
68. 2574D, XXIV (1969), declared that, pending the establishment of an
international regime for the deep ocean floor, states were to "refrain from
all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereoA beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." This so-called "moratorium resolution" is without real effect, however, since the specification of "beyond the limits of national jurisdiction"
begs the question of the area to which it is applicable, and because the
major technological powers have declared themselves not bound by the
substance of the resolution.
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forts of the past three years to create a new regime to govern the
exploitation of resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction, that is, beyond the legal seaward
limit of the continental shelf. The Nixon proposal of May 23, 1970,
and the subsequent Draft Convention tabled in Geneva on August
3, 1970, constitute one effort to establish such a regime. The next
section will outline briefly the history of the seabed question since
August, 1967, as a prelude to description and analysis of the Draft
Convention.
B. History of the Seabed Question Since August, 1967.69
August 17, 1967, may be specified as the date on which the seabed question was born, for on that date Ambassador Arvid Pardo,
representative of the Permanent Mission of Malta to the United
Nations, addressed a note verbale to Secretary-General U Thant of
the United Nations proposing the inclusion of an item in the agenda
of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly entitled "Declaration and Treaty Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for
Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-bed and of the Ocean Floor, Underlying the Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction,
and the Use of Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind."'70 In
an accompanying explanatory memorandum, Ambassador Pardo
pointed out that:
In view of rapid progress in the development of new techniques by
technologically advanced countries, it is feared that ... the seabed and ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond present national
jurisdiction, will become progressively and competitively subject
to national appropriation and use. This is likely to result in the
69. Among the many general analyses of the seabed question during
this era are Henkin, The General Assembly and the Sea, paper delivered

to the Fifth Annual Summer Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute,

University of Rhode Island; Pardo, Development of Ocean Space-An InternationalDilemma, 31 LA. L. REv. 45 (1970); Weissberg, InternationalLaw
Meets the Short-term National Interest: The Maltese Proposal on the Seabed and Ocean Floor-Its Fate in Two Cities, 18 IN'VL & COmp. L.Q. 41
(1969).
70. U. N. Doc. A/6695, reprinted in Interim Report on the United Nations and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967
(House Report No. 999) at 7R. See also the statement of Ambassador
Pardo before the First Committee, United Nations General Assembly, on
November 1, 1967 elaborating on his concepts [U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515
and A/C.1/PV.1516, also reprinted in Interim Report on the United Nations
and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources, at 2671.

militarizaton of the accessible ocean floor through the establishment of fixed military installations71 and in the exploitation and
depletion of resources of immense potential benefit to the world,
72
for the national advantage of technologically developed countries.
Accordingly, Ambassador Pardo stated:
[T]he time has come to declare the sea-bed and the ocean floor a
common heritage of mankind and ... immediate steps should
be taken to draft a treaty embodying ... the following principles:
(a) The sea-bed and ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the
limits of present national jurisdiction, are not subject to national
appropriation in any manner whatsoever;
(b) The exploration of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor...
shall be undertaken in a manner consistent with the Principles and
Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.
(c) The use of [the area] and [its] economic exploitation shall
be undertaken with the aim of safeguarding the interests of mankind. The net financial benefits derived from the use and exploitation of [the area] shall be used primarily to promote the development of poor countries;
(d) [The area] shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes in perpetuity.
Further, the memorandum provided:
It is believed that the proposed treaty should envisage the creation
of an international agency (a) to assume jurisdiction, as trustee for
all countries, over [the area]; (b) to regulate, supervise, and control all activities thereon; and (c) to ensure that the activities undertaken conform to the principles and provisions of the proposed
treaty.73
This original proposal is set forth here in some detail in order to
permit a comparison of its concepts with those embodied in the
Draft Convention. With the exception of the special zone of jurisdiction proposed in the Draft Convention (the "Trusteeship Area"),
the principal elements of the Pardo proposal have been adopted as
71. The seabed question has two aspects: (1) exploitation of marine resources, and (2) military uses of the marine environment. The latter is
beyond the scope of this paper, but the following references should provide a basic introduction to anyone interested in understanding the relation between the military and resource issues: Breckner, Some Dimensions
of Defense Interest in the Legal Delimitations of the Continental Shelf,
in THE LAw OF THE SEA: NATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 188 (Alexander

ed. 1970); Brown, The Legal Regime of Inner Space: Military Aspects, 22
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS, 181 (1969); Draft Treaty on the Prohibitionof the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 63 DEPT.
STATE BULL. 365 (1970); Evensen, Present Military Uses of the Seabed and
Foreseeable Developments 3 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 121 (1970); and Geneva
Disarmament Conference Agrees on Text of Treaty Banning Emplacement
of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed, 63 DEPT. STATE BULL. 362 (1970).
72. U. N. Doc. A/6695, para. 2 of Memorandum.
73. Id., paras. 3 and 4.
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the core of the United States policy on the seabed question. However, it was not at all clear in the fall of 1967 that this would be the
case.
Although President Lyndon Johnson had presaged the general
United States position in his comments at the commissioning of the
oceanographic research ship, Oceanographer,on July 13, 1966, 74 the
United States, as well as other technologically developed countries,
was very much taken by surprise as a result of the Maltese initiative. While the Secretary-General noted with respect to agenda
item 92 that the United Nations had been active in conducting research on the question of marine resources, 75 the twenty-second
session of the General Assembly was to provide the first concentrated effort toward developing a regime to govern the exploitation
of seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
The formal United States reaction to the Maltese proposal was
given by then United Nations Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg on
November 8, 1967, in a presentation in which United States options
were carefully protected and a 'go-slow" approach suggested for
the obvious reason of gaining time to develop policy. Ambassador
Goldberg noted:
While my Delegation believes that it is too early to take any final
decisions on proposals for a comprehensive legal regime for the
deep ocean floor . . .we would participate energetically in the
studies which will be needed before such decisions can be made. 76
Accordingly, Ambassador Goldberg, among others, suggested creation of a Committee on the Oceans to serve "as the focal point within
the general assembly for study and development of the next steps
74. The President there stated:
[U]nder no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the
prospects of rich harvest and mineral wealth to create a new form
of colonial competition among the maritime nations. We must be
careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under the high
seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms
are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings.
The President's Remarks at the Commissioning of the New Research Ship,
The "Oceanographer," July 13, 1966, 2 Wiay. Covm. PREs. Docs. (No. 28)
930, 931 (July 18, 1966).
75. See the Secretary-General's comments in U.N. Doc. A/C.1/952.
76. Statement of Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, November 8, 1967, before the First Committee, United Nations General Assembly, U.N. Press
Release USN-182, Nov. 8, 1967, reprinted in Interim Report on The United
Nations and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 287
(1967).

7
which the nations must take together in this field.""

In accordance with a general feeling on the part of technologically
developed powers that immediate action would be precipitous, the
General Assembly created an ad hoc committee to study the question of peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 78 The Ad Hoc Committee was requested
to prepare a study including a survey of past and present United
Nations activities with respect to the seabed question; an account of
scientific, technical, legal, and other aspects of the question; and
an indication regarding means to promote international cooperation in the exploitation of seabed resources.7 0 The Ad Hoc Committee held three sessions during 1968 and established two working
groups, one concerned with economic and technical aspects of the
agenda item, the other concerned with legal aspects. Its report was
adopted on August 30, 1968, and was subsequently delivered to the
twenty-third session of the General Assembly.80 The Report indicated the failure of the Ad Hoc Committee to reach agreement on a
statement of principles with respect to the seabed question:
In the course of the final session at Rio de Janeiro, consultations
took place between the various groups in an effort to find an acceptable formulation which would command unanimous support.
The efforts persisted until the end of the session and considerable
progress
was made, but final agreement could not be reached in
time.8 1

The Report was included in the agenda of the twenty-third session
of the General Assembly and was allocated to the First Committee
(Political and Security) for consideration and report. The First
Committee considered the item during October, November, and December, 1968, and at the conclusion of its deliberations recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of four draft resolutions.8 2

The four resolutions, all of which were adopted by the

77. Id. We have in this suggestion an international example of the bromide that the best way to get rid of an unwanted problem is to appoint a

committee to study it.
78. G.A. Res. 2340 XXII (1967), 7 INT'L LEGAL It EiTsa s 174 (1968).
The Ad Hoc Committee was composed of 35 states, including the United

States and the Soviet Union. See Goldberg, U.N. EstablishesAd Hoc Committee to Study Use of Ocean Floor, 58 DEP'T STATE BULL. 125 (1968).
79. Id. operative para. 2.
80. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdic-

tion, U.N. Doc. No. A/7230.
81. Id. para. 88.

82. See Report of the First Committee-Examination of the Question of
the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-Bed and
the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil there, Underlying the High Seas Beyond
the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction,and the Use of their Resources
in the Interests of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/7477.
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General Assembly on December 21, 1968, dealt with various aspects
of the seabed issue. Resolution 2467A 83 established a permanent
United Nations seabed committee, elaborating on the duties to be
performed by it; resolution 2467B 84 dealt with the hazards of pollution which might arise from the exploitation of seabed resources
and urged member states to take appropriate action with respect
thereto; resolution 2467C 8 5 requested the Secretary General to
undertake a study on the question of establishing in due time appropriate international machinery for the promotion of the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the seabed area and
the use of such resources in the interests of mankind; and resolution 2467D 8 6 endorsed the concept of the International Decade of
87
Ocean Exploration.
The permanent seabed committee returned to the tasks entrusted
to it with the hope of establishing a set of principles upon which to
base a regime for exploiting seabed resources, an effort in which the
ad hoc committee had failed. Like the ad hoc committee, the permanent Seabed Committee established two working subcommittees,
88
and held three sessions during 1969. The Committee's Report,
which indicated further failure to agree on a set of principles, was
submitted to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly
where the First Committee again recommended adoption of four
resolutions all of which were ultimately passed by the General Assembly. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in December, 1969 proved substantially more controversial than those
adopted a year earlier and greatly accelerated the pace at which
83. G. A. Res. 2467A XXIII (1968), 8 INT'L LEGAL
adopted by 112 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.
84. G. A. Res. 2467B (1968), 8

MATERIALS

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

201 (1969),

203 (1969), adopted

by 119 votes to none, with no abstentions.
85. G. A. Res. 2467C XXIII (1968), 8 INT'L. LEGAL IVIATERIALs 204 (1969),
adopted by 86 votes to 9, with 24 abstentions.
86. G. A. Res. 2467D XXIII (1968), 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS 205 (1969),
adopted without vote, without objection.
87. On the adoption of these four resolutions, see Haight, The Seabed
and the Ocean Floor, 3 INT'L LAWYER 642 (1969).
88. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U. N. Doc.
A/7622. On the work of the Committee, see U.N. Seabed Committee Concludes Spring Session, 60 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 285 (1969). See also Department Reviews History of InternationalEfforts Governing Activities on the
Seabed, 61 DEP'T STATE BULL. 191 (1969).

nations began to develop their policy positions with respect to the
seabed question. Resolution 2574A8 9 requested the Secretary General:
[T]o ascertain the views of Member States on the desirability of
convening at an early date a conference on the law of the sea to review the regimes of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas, particularly in order to arrive at a
clear, precise and internationally accepted definition of the area of
the sea-bed and ocean floor which lies beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, in the light of the international regime to be established for that area .... 90
The replies to the inquiry of the Secretary General made pursuant
to that resolution were largely favorable to convening a conference 91 and, as noted earlier, the General Assembly at its twentyfifth session called for the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea.
Resolution 2574B 92 urged the Seabed Committee to continue with
its work in an attempt to reach agreement on principles to govern
the seabed regime and resolution 2574C 93 urged the Secretary General to prepare further studies on the subject of international machinery to govern exploitation of seabed resources.
By far the most controversial resolution was 2574D, 94 the socalled "moratorium resolution," which declared that pending the
establishment of an international regime for the seabed:
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain
from all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the
seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction;
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recognized. 95
This resolution was adopted over the vigorous opposition of the
United States and other technologically advanced countries who
saw it as a potential impediment to development of offshore mineral
89. G. A. Res. 2574A XXIV (1969), 9 INT'L LEGAL 1MATERiALs 419 (1970),
adopted by 65 votes to 12, with 30 abstentions.
90. Id. operative para. 1.

91. See U.N. Doc. A/7925 which contains replies to the SecretaryGeneral's inquiry from 44 governments, including the United States, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France.
92.

G. A. Res. 2574B XXIV (1969), 9 INT'L. LEGAL MATmuALs 420 (1970),

adopted by 109 votes to 0, with 1 abstention.
93. G. A. Res. 2574C XXIV (1969), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATE rIALs 421 (1970),
adopted by 100 votes to 0, with 11 abstentions.
94. G. A. Res. 2574) XXIV (1969), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALs 422 (1970),
adopted by 62 votes to 28, with 28 abstentions.
95. Id. operative paras. (a) and (b).

Draft U.N. Convention
SAN DIEGO LAW PEVIEW

recovery technology.96 As noted above,9 6a the inability to determine the area to which the moratorium applied because of the failure to have agreed on the "limits of national jurisdiction," and the
statement of the United States Government that it would not be
bound by the resolution, made the General Assembly's effort of
dubious value. In fact, it has been suggested that the resolution had
just the opposite effect from that intended by encouraging coastal
states to accelerate the seaward extension of offshore technology in
order to stake out as large an area as possible under the label of
"national jurisdiction" pursuant to the exploitability provision of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf. In any event, the question of
the legal effect of the moratorium resolution has become somewhat
less important in view of (1) the fact that there is at present no
commercial offshore operation in water depths beyond 200 meters, 97
and (2) the initiative of the United States Government in proposing
an interim policy prior to adoption of an international regime for
the seabed area.98
The Seabed Committee subsequently returned to its deliberations
but achieved no agreement on a set of principles through its August,
1970 meeting in Geneva. 99
The restriction of this account, so far, to activities at the United
Nations should not imply that other groups, both public and private, were not equally active. The United States Congress expended considerable effort to determine just what the effect of the
United Nations' actions on the seabed question were on the Na96. See the policy reasons for the United States opposition to resolution
2574D in U.S. Explains Its Votes on Seabed Resolutions, 62 Dm"'T STATE
BULL. 89 (1970). On the Assembly session generally see Haight, Sea-Bed
Discussions in the Twenty-Fourth General Assembly, 3 NAT'L REs. LAwYER
405 (1970).
96a. See supra note 68.
97. Statement of Hon. Elliot L. Richardson, Under Secretary of State
and Testimony of John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser of the Department of
State, in Hearings on Issues Related to Establishment of Seaward Boundary of United States Outer Continental Shelf before the Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf of the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, 427, 452 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Richardson Statement or Stevenson Testimony].
98. See section IM.F, this article.
99. See Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N.
Doc. A/8021.

tional interest as well as what United States' policy ought to be.
The Congressional proceedings can be classed generally as conservative, with the exception of the efforts of Senator Claiborne Pell. 10°
The most notable effort of the Federal government was the Report
of the President's Commission on Marine Science, Engineering
and Resources' 0 1 which outlined in some detail an international regime to govern exploitation of seabed resources beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. Other groups also made proposals for seabed regimes, including the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 02 the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 10 8
100. See, e.g., S. Res. 172 and 186, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) and S.
Res. 33 and 92, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Hearings were held on S. Res.
33 in July, 1969. See Hearings on S. Res. 33 before the Subcommittee on
Ocean Space of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969). For other published records of Congressional activity in
this area, see: Interim Report on the United Nations and the Issue of Deep
Ocean Resources, Subcommittee on International Organizationsand Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1967); The Oceans: A ChallengingNew Frontier,a Report and Hearings
by the Subcommittee on InternationalOrganizationsand Movements of the
House Committee on ForeignAffairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Hearing
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. J. Res. 111, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Minerals,
Materials,and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on Issues Related to Establishment of Seaward Boundary of United
States Outer Continental Shelf and Related Matter, Including S. 3970 to
Amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970;
Hearings on Issues Related to Establishment of Seaward Boundary of
United States Outer Continental Shelf before the Subcommittee on Outer
Continental Shelf of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1969, 1970), Parts 1 and 2.
101. The Commission was created pursuant to Public Law 89-454, the
"Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966." The Report of the Commission, "Our Nation and the Sea: A Plan for National
Action," was published, together with three volumes of Panel Reports relating to the principal Report, in January, 1969. The portions of the Report pertinent to the seabed question can be found at 141-57 of "Our Nation and the Sea," and at VIII-10 through VIII-44 of the Report of the
InternationalPanel ("Marine Resources and Legal-Political Arrangements
for Their Development," Vol. 3, Panel Reports).
102. Elizabeth Mann Borgese's concepts were outlined in The Republic

of the Deep Seas, 1

THE CENTER MAGAZINE

(No. 4) 18 (1968) and in The

Ocean Regime: A Suggested Statute for the Peaceful Uses of the High Seas
and the Sea-Bed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, a Center Occasional Paper, Vol. 1, No. 5 (October, 1968). Her ideas were further amplified through the Pacem in Maribus Convocation held in Malta during
June-July, 1970, proceedings from which should be available sometime
during 1971.
103. See Christy and Brooks, Shared Resources of the World Community; and Michael, Avoiding the Militarization of the Seas; all in NEW
DIMENSIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS: THE PROBLEMS FOR THE NEXT DECADE,
THE SEVENTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION

respectively at 36, 135, 167 (1966).
C.S.O.P. position, see THE UNITED NATIONS AND
OF PEACE

For refinements on the
THE BED Or THE SEA, THE
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the National Petroleum Council, 10 4 and the World Peace Through
Law Center.105 Among the many proposals and suggestions were
those to place title to the seabed in the United Nations, 0 6 to establish no regime other than the control to be exercised by the nation whose flag the vessel or structure flies, 07 to develop a new and
comprehensive international organization to administer exploitation of seabed resources, 08 to do nothing at present and simply let
10 9
a system evolve on a case by case, or conflict by conflict, basis,
to establish an international agency whose sole function with respect
to seabed resource exploitation would be to record claims made for
notice purposes," 0 and to extend national jurisdiction to mid-ocean
on an equidistance or other principle."' There were, of course,
other proposals, both complex and simple, and an incredible amount
of literature on the seabed question and matters ancillary thereto." 2
NINETEENTH REPORT OF THE CoInVIISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF

PEACE (March, 1969), and THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BED OF THE SEA
(II), THE TWENTY-FIRST REPORT OF THE COIVVISSION TO STUDY THE ORGAN-

IZATION OF PEACE (June, 1970).

The latter contains a proposed draft statute

for a United National Sea-Bed Authority.
104. Petroleum Resources Under the Ocean Floor prepared by the National Petroleum Council's Committee on Petroleum Resources Under the
Ocean Floor (March, 1969).
105. Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of the Ocean Bed, prepared by the United Nations Committee of the World Peace Through Law
Center (Pamphlet Series No. 10, 1969).
106. See, e.g., Creamer, Title to the Deep Seabed: Prospects for the
Future, 9 HARv. INT'L L. J. 205 (1968); Eichelberger, A Case for the Administrationof Marine Resources Underlying the High Seas by the United
Nations, 1 NATURAL RESOURCES LAw. 85 (No. 2) (1968).
107. See, e.g., Ely, A Case for the Administration of Mineral Resources
Underlying the High Seas by National Interests, 1 NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW. 78 (No. 2) (1968); Wilkey, The Deep Ocean: Its Potential Mineral
Resources and Problems,3 INT'L LAWYER 31 (1968).
108. See, e.g., Borgese, The Ocean Regime, supra note 102; The United
Nations and the Bed of the Sea (II), supra note 103.
109. See, e.g., Ely, American Policy Options in the Development of
Undersea Mineral Resources, 2 INT'L LAWYER 215, 217 (1968); Stang, The
Walls Beneath the Sea, 94 U.S. NAy. INST. PROc. 33 (No. 3) (1968).
110. See, e.g., Goldie, The Contents of Davy Jones's Locker-A Proposed Regime for the Seabed and Subsoil, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1967).
111. See, e.g., Bernfeld, Developing the Resources of the Sea-Security
of Investment, 2 INT'L LAWYER 67 (1967), also published in 1 NATURAL RESOURCES LAw. 82 (No. 1) (1968). For an indication of possible consequences
of adoption of this "national lake" theory, see the map appended to Tns
LAW or T=E SEA: THm FUTU OF THE SEA'S RESOURCES (Alexander ed. 1968).
112. Two bibliographies covering this era have been prepared: Konss,
The Debate on the Legal Regime for the Exploration and Exploitation of

The formulation of United States policy was achieved through an
inter-governmental agency group assigned to analyze the seabed
question and produce policy recommendations thereon. The range
of inputs to the group was broad:
Extensive discussions were held among all of the interested departments and agencies of the U. S. Government. The members of
the executive branch benefited from the hearings held by [the
Senate Subcommittee on the Outer Continental Shelf] and by other
committees and subcommittees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as from many private discussions with Members of the Congress.
We also had the benefit of numerous discussions with leaders of
industry and representatives of various public groups. We found
that the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering,
and Resources ... and reports prepared by the Secretary General
of the United Nations were very helpful.
Also, as a participant in the U. N. Seabeds Committee and its
predecessor, the Ad Hoc Seabeds Committee,
we gained much from
112a
hearing the views of other countries.

The actual origin of the first formal United States' policy statement,
however, was within the Department of State, specifically involving then Undersecretary of State Elliott Richardson, who submitted
one of several position papers on the seabed question to the White
House. The Richardson position paper was ultimately adopted by
the White House staff and the policy statement drafted there was
approved by the Department of State. On May 23, 1970, President
Nixon issued the statement outlining for the first time the United
States' policy on the seabed.1 1 s Although the Nixon Proposal was
only a bare-bones outline of an international regime, the interagency group was at that time well on its way to fleshing out the
proposal in the form of a draft treaty as evidenced by the positions
taken by Under-Secretary Richardson and Legal Advisor Stevenson at the May 27, 1970 outer continental shelf policy hearings. As
noted above, the Draft Convention was tabled in Geneva on August
3, 1970, thus ending one chapter of the seabed story and beginning
another.

Ocean Resources: A Bibliography for the First Decade, 1960-1970, Special
Publictaion No. 1, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island
(May 1970); and VITZTHUM, PACEM Iw MAsIus: SELECTED BIMLIOGRAPHY,
(1970).
112a. RichardsonStatement, supranote 97, at 429.
113. Nixon, United States Policy for the Seabed, 9 INTL' LEGAL MATErIALS 807 (1970), 62 DP'T STATE BULL. 737 (1970). The substance of the
Nixon proposal will not be discussed here since it is simply a sketch outline of the more comprehensive Draft Treaty. The full text of the Nixon
Proposal follows this article as Exhibit A.
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C. The Draft Convention.
The Draft Convention, to be discussed in detail in the remainder
of this paper, would create a legal-economic regime to govern the
exploitation of seabed resources and an administrative machinery
to manage regime. An International Seabed Area would be created and defined as the area of seabed and subsoil lying seaward of
a 200 meter isobath boundary. This area, to be the "common heritage of mankind," would be divided into two portions, one (the International Trusteeship Area) lying between the 200 meter isobath boundary and the seaward edge of the continental margin, and
the other (the non-trustee portion of the International Seabed
Area) lying seaward of the continental margin boundary. Within
the Trusteeship Area the adjacent coastal state would administer
all exploration and exploitation activities, under whatever conditions and rules it chose to prescribe, subject only to the general provisions of the Draft Convention covering the entire International
Seabed Area. A portion of the revenues derived from activities
conducted in this area, however, would be payable to the International Seabed Resource Authority. Beyond the Trusteeship Area,
the administering authority would be the International Seabed Resource Authority, and all revenues derived from operations in this
area would be payable to it. The revenues thus generated would
be used to assist developing countries and to support research efforts relating to exploitation of seabed resources.
The Authority would be composed of an Assembly (an organ in
which each party to the Convention would participate, but which
would have little real power), a Council (which would be effectively
controlled by the major technological powers and which would be
the effective policy and decision making body of the Authority), a
Tribunal (to administer the compulsory dispute settlement provisions of the Convention), a Secretariat, and three standing Commissions (to administer such matters as boundary determination, operations, and rules and recommended practices).
Before entry into force, all nations are required to condition resource exploration and exploitation activities occurring on their continental shelves beyond the 200 meter isobath on the international
regime to be adopted, thus preventing any interim acts which might
destroy the effectiveness of the Convention concepts. The Draft

Convention contains five appendices providing detailed rules for licensing and operations in the International Seabed Area as well as
formulae for allocation of Authority revenues and determination
of Council membership. Finally, the Draft Convention envisions
"annexes" to be prepared by one of the Commissions which would
be in the nature of regulations governing seabed activities permitted by the Convention.
Given this thumbnail sketch, for orientation and vocabulary purposes, I shall now turn to a more in-depth analysis of the provisions
of the Draft Convention, and make some comments thereon.
III.

SUAMinv
Y OF PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION,
AND SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTSllSa

A. Preface-TheCompromise Nature of the Draft Convention.
As must necessarily be the case with any National policy decision
of major importance, the Draft Convention represents a compromise
among several United States' interest groups. As must also necessarily be the case with any document designed for international
acceptance, the Draft Convention also represents a possible compromise among several views prevalent in the international community.114 Thus, the compromise is both internal and external.
113a. My intent in the remainder of this paper is not to attempt a
comprehensive enumeration and evaluation of all of the issues involved in
the Draft Convention or the seabed question, but rather to raise a few
selected issues which I feel are of particular importance and to outline some
of the thoughts which have occurred to me on these issues. In short, this
is the broad overview to be supplemented during the next three years by
in-depth analysis of single issues.
Further, the specific criticisms contained in this paper should be viewed
as constructive criticism and not as indicating dissatisfaction with the concepts proposed in the Draft Convention. As will be noted in section IV, I
fell the Draft Convention is, by and large, an excellent proposal and one
which will serve well the national interests, the interests of the international community, and the interests of operating companies upon whom we
must rely for exploitation of deep ocean resources.
114. In testifying before the Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, Elliott
Richardson, then Under Secretary of State, observed:
As you can see [the Nixon Proposal] is calculated to meet a
number of competing interests, and does reflect very considerable
and careful deliberations within the administration....
[B] etween the international legal provisions applicable to territorial seas... on the one side and those applicable to the exploitation and exploration of the seabeds on the other, in the case of the
seabeds, we were searching for a way of recognizing a broad and
international interest on the one side and the opportunity to dedicate resources to all mankind, while on the other recognizing that
there are very real and very legitimate interests on the part of the
coastal states in the waters off their shores.
Richardson Statement, supra note 97 at 432, 434. Secretary of State Rogers
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The policy determinants in these compromises have been excellently discussed elsewhere 5 and I will only summarize briefly
here the nature of the conflicts of interest involved.
Internally, the petroleum industry and to a substantial extent the
Department of the Interior, desired maximization of seabed areas
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. This position resulted in part from a desire to continue to operate beyond
the 200 meter isobath under the same legal regime which has been
applicable to offshore oil operations under Federal jurisdiction since
1953, the date of enactment of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act.1 6 Similarly the industry would probably prefer to continue
to negotiate directly with other nations under existing arrangements for concessions or other rights permitting exploitation of
offshore resources. Admittedly, there is a certain security in operating under a regime which one has found to be suitable, and it
appears to be this desire for maintenance of the status quo (which,
by and large, has produced favorable economic results for the industries affected) that guides the industry's thinking. Further,
there is the expected inertia of any complex industrial organization against radical changes in routine. Although, as will be
pointed out later, the regime proposed in the Draft Convention may
be quite favorable to the hydrocarbon, natural gas, and hard mineral mining industries involved, nonetheless there is an understandable reluctance to "learn the ropes" of an entirely new administrative sytem. This reluctance should be ameliorated somewhat, however, by the trusteeship zone concept which permits the coastal state
also noted: "The Draft Convention was designed to accommodate the different interests of a large number of nations." List of Questions Pertinent to the Outer Continental Shelf Submitted to the State Department
by the Committee, and Their Answers, in Hearings on Issues Related to
Establishment of Seaward Boundary of United States Outer Continental
Shelf of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., part 2, 463, 466 (answer to Question No. 15) (1970) [Hereinafter
cited as Rogers].
115. Ratiner, United States Oceans Policy: An Analysis, 2 J. MuzrrnwE
L. & Commrv. 225 (1970). Mr. Ratiner is an attorney in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and is Chairman of the Department of Defense Advisory Group on the Law of the Sea. He was, and remains, an active
participant in the inter-agency group responsible for drafting and negotiating the agreements to be reached at the 1973 Conference.
116. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964)
(originally enacted as Act of August 7, 1953, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462).

to apply the administrative regime of its choice from the 200 meter
isobath to the edge of the continental margin, there being a strong
likelihood that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act will be made
applicable to the edge of the United States' continental margin and
the existing systems continued there. 117 Finally, the adoption of
such a regime is apt to encourage less developed coastal nations to
imitate the regime proposed for the International Seabed Area beyond the Trusteeship Area and it is possible this would offer to the
industries involved less favorable treatment than they have been
able to exact from these states in the past. However, as also noted
later, there are concomitant benefits which would seem clearly to
outweigh this fear.
On the other side of the fence stand the Department of Defense
and the State Department, both of whom are actively supporting
the adoption of a seabed regime such as that outlined in the Draft
Convention. The Department of Defense is, of course, interested
in preserving national security and to this extent is very much interested in securing an international agreement on free passage
through, under, and over international straits as well as access to
the seabed of continental margins beyond the 200 meter isobath.
The Department of Defense thus sees the seabed regime as (1)
an appropriate tradeoff for acquisition of these other rights,
and (2) an assurance against further unilateral extension of
exclusive coastal state authority over the seabed. The Department of State's primary interest seems to lie in structuring an
international regime to govern the exploitation of seabed resources which will benefit not only the United States but the international community at large and which will therefore further
the foreign policy interests of the United States. These interests
will not be detailed here but are dealt with in a separate section concerning the interests served by the Draft Convention.11 8 Suffice it
to say here that the struggle between these two opposing factions
(and it should be noted parenthetically that there are many shades
of opinion on the issues involved-that this is no black-and-white
problem) has been long and arduous. A great deal of input was
provided by all interested parties and the Draft Convention is the
compromise result of those inputs. Typical of the compromise is the
trusteeship zone concept. 110 On the one extreme there are those
117. See post section III.D.2, however, where I suggest that it may be
more desirable to establish a new regime to govern resource exploration
and exploitation activities in the United States' Trusteeship Area.
118. See post section IV.
119. Secretary of State Rogers noted specifically on this point:
The concept of trusteeship was devised as a new means of achiev-
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who would have preferred an international regime beginning at
the limit of the territorial sea (twelve miles) and on the other hand
those that would have preferred extension of exclusive coastal state
jurisdiction to the middle of the oceans (or at least to the edge of
the continental margin). The trusteeship zone concept offers a
compromise by permitting the international community to gain the
revenue from the area seaward of the 200 meter isobath boundary
(thus satisfying in part the "internationalists") while yet retaining
a sufficient measure of coastal state jurisdiction out to the continental margin to satify more chauvinistic interests.
On the international level there are many interest groups involved, although the principal struggle is between the technologically advanced countries with large continental shelf areas, who
obviously stand to profit internally from a wide shelf under exclusive coastal state jurisdiction, and less developed countries with
no appreciable resources in their offshore areas. Neither side seems
to have sufficient votes to secure the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption of their respective positions at an international
conference and thus the Draft Convention serves as a compromise
between these interests by permitting technological powers with
broad shelves to effectively control the Authority, to derive substantial revenues, and to retain control over the energy resources,
while at the same time providing a source of revenue for the havenot nations of the world. There are, of course, less developed countries with broad continental shelves which are resource rich and
who would side with those who wish to extend exclusive coastal
state jurisdiction; and there are also states whose onshore resources
are so critical to their economies that they wish economic control
over ocean production (for example, Kuwait and certain Latin
American states with respect to oil and hard minerals, repectively).
Accordingly, in reviewing the Draft Convention and in analyzing
its provisions one should bear in mind that this is not an ideal document from any particular interest group's point of view but that it
is the result of compromise process, the end product being a regime
which will maximize net benefits to the world community.
ing an accommodation between the interests of the international
community in general and the interests of coastal states.
Rogers' Answers, supra note 114 at 463 (answer to Question No. 1).

B. Basic Principles-TheConcept of "Common Heritage."
The fundamental objectives of the Draft Convention seem to be
(1) to maximize the area of seabed not subject to exclusive coastal
state jurisdiction and (2) to provide economic benefits for the international community at large rather than to coastal states on the
basis of national proximity to seabed resources. This, it must be
presumed, is the implementation of the concept of "common heritage" as set forth in Article 1 of the Draft Convention: "The International Seabed Area shall be the common heritage of all mankind."
This notion of "common heritage of mankind" has appeared frequently throughout the debate on the seabed question, both in the
United Nations and elsewhere, but it has never been precisely defined, if indeed it is capable of any more precise definition than the
above specification of fundamental Draft Convention objectives.
Ambassador Pardo used the term in his August, 1967, United Nations speech suggesting that "the time has come to declare the seabed and the ocean floor a common heritage of mankind." A year
earlier President Johnson had urged that the deep seas and ocean
bottoms remain "the legacy of all human beings," language closely
approximating the common heritage notion. Most recently, President Nixon used the term in his May 23, 1970 policy statement:
I am today proposing that all nations adopt as soon as possible a
treaty under which they would renounce all national claims over
the natural resources of the seabed beyond the point where the
high seas reach a depth of 200 meters and would agree to regard
these resources as the common heritage of manldnd.120
The use of a phrase such as "common heritage" in a document of
this type has obvious drawbacks because of the general danger of
using, in a new context, an old phrase about which people may
have preconceived notions. It was in a not altogether facetious vein
that Francis T. Christy suggested at the Pacem In Maribus Convocation held in Malta during the summer, 1970 that those debating
the seabed question would be better off to refer to this concept as
"Herman Comitage," thus avoiding problems of preconceived notions, whether legal, economic, social, or otherwise. Professor L.F.E.
Goldie recently made a similar observation with respect to the distinction between registry and recording systems for seabed regimes,
terminology which has also been used quite freely in describing international regimes to govern exploitation of seabed resources without much attention to its precise legal meaning,'2 '
Accordingly, the most satisfactory approach to understanding
"common heritage" would be to briefly review the Draft Conven120. Nixon, United States Policy for the Seabed, supra note 113.
121. Goldie, Two Neglected Problems in Drafting Regimes for Deep
Ocean Resources, 64 Am. J. INT'D.L. 905 (1970).
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tion with a view toward determining what provisions, if any, deal
with the broad subject of international or communal, rather than
national, aspects of resource allocation. Such an examination results in identification of three areas which one might conclude reflect the concept of common heritage. These are (1) a doctrine of
non-appropriation, (2) distribution of revenues on an international
basis, and (3) and international administrative system for the International Seabed Area.lsa In each of these categories national
exclusivity is eliminated or diminished in favor of international or
communal jurisdiction, regulation or receipt of profit.
The concept of non-appropriation is contained in Article 2 of the
Draft Convention which prohibits any state from claiming or exercising sovereignty or sovereign rights, or recognizing any such
claim or exercise, over any part of the International Seabed Area
or its resources. Article 2 further provides that no state has nor
may acquire any right, title, or interest in the International Seabed Area or its resources except pursuant to the resource disposition provisions of the Draft Convention. Article 2 thus contains
provisions similar to those in the outer space treaty and the Antarctic treaty with respect to non-appropriation, effectively removing national interest in the area and replacing it with an international administrative system. The Treaty of Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies12 2 provides in Article 2 that "[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means."
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, of course, prohibits states from acquiring any interest in Antarctic territory through the conduct
of activities permitted by the convention, specifically scientific researclL 12 3 Since some property interest is necessary if the resources
121a. See Pavicevic, The Ocean Floor-The Common Heritage of Mankind, 20 REVIEW OF INTL AFAiRS (Belgrade) (No. 478) 33, 34 (1970) which
I reviewed after completion of this section of the paper. "Three elements
of the conception that the ocean floor is the 'common heritage of mankind'
are that the ocean floor is common property, that there should be joint administration of it and that there should be a joint and just distribution of
benefits."
122. 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, done Jan. 27, 1967, in force for
the United States Oct. 10, 1967.
123. The Antarctic Treaty, 12 U.S.T. 794 (1961), T.LA.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71, done Dec. 1, 1959 in force for the United States June 23, 1961.

of an area are to be exploited, the Draft Convention goes on to
provide detailed rules with respect to the manner in which states
or persons may acquire sufficient interests, through the licensing
of exploration and exploitation rights, in order to economically exploit these resources. These methods will be discussed in the section concerning disposition policies. The working paper contains
a caveat following Article 2 stating:
(NOTE: The preceding Article is not intended to imply that
States do not currently have rights under, or consistent with,
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.)

This qualification may have been aimed at critics of the Draft Convention who suggested that the United States, by the draft's nonappropriation and "transition" provisions, was making a unilateral
renunciation of rights to seabed resources which may appertain to
the United States by virtue of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf. Such an assertion was made in the Allott-Jackson-BellmonMetcalf letter of July 21, 1970, to Secretary of State Rogers in
which it was said that:
Article 2 carries with it the improper implication that the United
States has in fact already renounced its sovereign rights to the
natural resources of the seabed of the U. S. continental margin
beyond the 200 meter depth limit. Further, it purports to surrender
our sovereign rights to those resources without any provision that
such renunciation would be effective only upon the condition that a
sizable majority of other coastal states would likewise agree to
surrender their sovereign rights to such resources. In other words,
it appears to be a unilateral renunciation without any quid pro
quo.
Such a position seems untenable in view of President Nixon's own
statement that:
[A]lthough I hope agreement on [an international seabed regime]
can be reached quickly, the negotiation of such a complex treaty
may take some time ....
A substantial portion of the revenues derived by a state from exploitation beyond 200 meters during this
interim period should be turned over to an appropriate international development agency for assistance to developing countries.
I would plan to seek appropriate congressional action to make such
funds available as soon as a sufficient number of other states also
indicate their willingness to join this interim policy.124 (emphasis
added.)

Distribution of revenue may be made to two categories of recipients. The revenue may be used (1) as indirect assistance for the
promotion of the economic advancement of developing states [Article 5 (1) and Appendix D, §3.1] and (2) for the purpose specified

in Article 5(2), namely the promotion of research, development of
124. Nixon, United States Policy for the Seabed, supra note 113, at
737-38.
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knowledge, and the providing of technical assistance, with respect
to the exploitation of seabed resources. 125 Thus the income is not
allocated on a basis of national proximity to the resource but rather
on the basis of the needs of the international community at large.
Finally, of course, an international rather than an exclusively
national regime is established to administer the International Seabed Area, although a substantial incursion on this concept was
made with the adoption of the trusteeship area in which the coastal state may prescribe any system of its choosing for the disposition of the resources. In this category, then, national control is
diminished but not entirely removed.
Thus, common heritage seems to mean, as noted at the outset of
this section, that as large an area of seabed as is politically feasible
will be freed from potential assertions of national sovereignty and
will be made subject to administration on an international basis,
with the object of providing subsidies for developing countries and
for scientific research to benefit all mankind.
In addition to the concept of "common heritage" the basic principles section of the Draft Convention contains provisions relating
to: (1) reservation of the International Seabed Area exlusively for
peaceful purposes (Art. 4); (2) maintenance of the freedom of the
high seas (Art. 6); (3) shared or multiple use of the marine environment (Arts. 7 and 8); and (4) insurance against damage to
human life and safety, and the marine environment (Art. 9; see
also Art. 23).
An issue clearly fundamental to effectuation of the basic principles (including the common heritage concept) of the Draft Convention concerns the status of non-parties to the Convention, should
it be adopted and enter into force. Until such time as the Convention becomes customary international law binding on the entire
international community (an event not likely to transpire soon),
non-party states would be free to exercise rights under the customary international law rules of the doctrine of the continental
shelf or of the Convention on the Continental Shelf if they were
party thereto. Presumably there would be no legal impediment to
such activities. However, there are a number of reasons why such
125. See a more detailed discussion of the revenue disposition system,
section III.E., this article.

activity is not likely, beyond the simple political solution of bringing economic pressure to bear on the non-conforming states. Such
reasons include: (1) the guarantee provided in the Convention
that states can give valid licenses to companies which might otherwise refrain from operating in that state's shelf or slope area; (2)
the desire, on the part of less developed states, to share in the revenues to be distributed by the Authority; and (3) the desire, on the
part of technologically advanced states to provide for a stable
ocean mining regime.126 These arguments seem compelling, and in
view of the high number of ratifications suggested before entry
into force (see post sec.
YI.F)the United States is not likely,
should it ratify the Convention, to find itself in an unworkable
minority.
C. The InternationalSeabed Resource Authority.
An administrative structure (or "machinery") to administer the
exploitation of non-living resources of the seabed beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction is necessitated by the legal-economic regime adopted for that function. It is conceiveable that regimes
could be adopted which would require either none or a minimal
amount of international machinery for administration purposes. For
instance, if the non-living resources of the seabed were analogized
to the living resources of the high seas, as some have attempted to
do, and the exploitation system was carried out in the same manner as international fisheries, that is, on a res nullius basis with
title going to the person who first reduces the resource to his possession, then little or no international machinery would be required,
exploiters being governed solely by the rules of the nation whose
flag their vessel or structure flies. Of course, even in international
fisheries some international institutionalization has been required
(regional fishery bodies already exist), so it is not likely, even under the so-called "flag-nation" theory of exploiting non-living resources, that no machinery would be required. However, under
this system or under a recordation system, in which claims need
only be placed of record for notice purposes, a quite minimal international organization would be needed.
However, the legal-economic regime proposed by the United
States in the Draft Convention is quite comprehensive and requires
an organization of substantial size and complexity to perform the
research, administrative, policy making, and dispute settling func126. These suggestions were made by Legal Adviser Stevenson to the

Senate Outer Continental Shelf Subcommittee.
supra note 97, at 445.

See Stevenson Testimony,

Draft U.N. Convention
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

tions. Accordingly, the International Seabed Resource Authority
(Authority hereinafter) was designed to fill the role of administrative machinery with respect to the legal-economic regime proposed in the Draft Convention. The Authority is composed of an
Assembly, a Council, a Tribunal, a Secretariat, and three standing
Commissions. The legal status of the Authority is to be the same,
together with privileges and immunities, as specified in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. 12 7 There follows a description of the organization and function of each of these organs of the Authority.
The Assembly. Each state party to the Convention is a member of the Assembly and exercises one vote therein. 128 The Assembly is convened a minimum of once every three years although
extraordinary sessions may be convened on call of the Council or
by the Secretary-General of the Authority at the request of twenty
percent of the Contracting Parties. Assembly decisions are by majority vote.129 The powers and duties of the Assembly are set forth
in Articlte 35 and it becomes clear on a reading thereof that the
Council rather than the Assembly is actually the decision and policy making organ of the Authority since most of the Assembly's
functions are approbative or ministerial. Most importantly, the
Assembly does have the authority to approve budgets proposed
by the Council and to approve proposals by the Council for changes
130
in allocation of net income of the Authority.
The Council. The Council is to be composed of twenty-four states
party to the Convention, with Council membership being divided
into two categories: (1) the six most industrially advanced parties
and (2) eighteen additional parties of which at least twelve are to
be developing countries, the eighteen to be selected on the basis of
equitable geographical distribution. 13oa Further, at least two of
the twenty-four Council members must be landlocked or shelflocked countries. 131 The importance of the "big six" lies in the
fact that decisions of the Council require not only approval by a
127. 33 U.N.T.S. 261.
128. Draft Convention,supra note 6, Art. 34(1) and (4).
129. Id., Art. 34(2) and (5).
130. Id., Art. 35(f) and (g).
130a. Id., Art. 36(1) and (2).
131. Id., Art. 36(3).

majority of all twenty-four of its members, but also a majority of
members in each of the two categories. 32 Thus, in order to adopt
a proposal, at least four of the "big six" must favor the proposal
and, although there is no veto power, any three of the "big six"
could block affirmative action. This provides a guarantee for the
technologically developed countries that the Authority will be run
in accordance with the policies of those who have the greatest financial and political stake in seabed operations, and yet avoids the
veto problem which has hamstrung the United Nations Security
Council for twenty-five years. There must be doubts, however, as
to the salability of this provision to the less developed countries.
The quid pro quo is, as always, the share of revenues which the developing states will derive from an efficiently run Authority, yet
the same developing states are likely to be chary of United States
intentions in such a proposal-they have expressed fears for some
years now of a United States-Soviet Union hegemony over world
military, political, and economic affairs, and when one throws Japan and West Germany into the picture, a powerful alliance is
created indeed. On the other hand, it is problematic whether the
major technological and wide shelf countries would enter into any
such agreement in the absence of reasonable assurances of control
over the organization and its operations.
The proposal for selecting the six most industrially advanced parties set forth in Appendix E is based on the following formula:
those six Contracting Parties which are both developed States and
have the highest gross national product shall be considered as the
33
six most industrially advanced Contracting Parties.1

Under this formula, the Council decides which states are the six
most industrially advanced prior to each regular session of the Assembly and reports its decision to the Assembly. The Appendix
does not specify the criteria to be used in making the requisite
determinations, but merely provides the the Council "shall make
rules to ensure that all questions relating to the determination of
such Contracting Parties are considered by an impartial committee before being decided upon by the Council."1 34 There are obviously two key problems in this selection procedure:

(1) whose

GNP figures, determined on what basis, will be taken as authoritative, and (2) which countries are to be designated as developed
and which as developing for example, the United States Department of State maintains a breakdown of developed and developing
132. Id., Art. 38.

133. Id., Appendix E, Sec. 1.
134. Id., Appendix E, Sec. 3.
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states but it is doubtful whether the international community
would accept reference to a United States source alone since unilateral manipulation of the lists could conceivably be utilized to
fix membership on the Council in accordance with U. S. wishes.
My principal criticism, however, of the criteria for determining
"big six" membership on the Council is the exclusive reliance on
gross national product figures as a measure of industrial advancement or, for that matter, the use of the basic requirement of industrial advancement at all as a measure of the state's role or interest in exploitation of seabed resources. I am here making the perhaps unwarranted assumption that "big six" membership should go
to those states having the greatest economic, technological, and geographical interest in offshore mining rather than those wielding
general economic or technological power. The use of GNP alone
as a criteria for industrial advancement could conceivably permit
inclusion of the "big six" of a state with no continental shelf resources, no offshore technology, and a minimal interest in the activities conducted there. That is, of course, not the case if one
takes GNP figures of recent years, but the criteria utilized should
be valid for all time and should not be used simply as a device for
packing the Council with state currently possessing political power
or other attributes making them desirable as control elements in
the Authority.
I would suggest that there are a number of factors, admittedly
including GNP, which should be considered in determining membership in this most important category. These would include:
(1) GNP (which, although as I have indicated may not be sufficient in itself, certainly should be considered in any list of factors);
(2) Area of continental shelf and slope;
(3) Resource potential of continental shelf and slope;
(4) Dollar value of marine resource production; and
(5) Dollar investment in offshore technology.
Three items, namely GNP, shelf area, and dollar value of marine resource production are readily ascertainable and could be combined
in a formula for determining the states with the greatest stake in
seabed exploitation. Potential resource evaluation and dollar investment in offshore technology would be substantially more dif-

ficult to quantify, but are nonetheless important aspects of a state's
interest in the marine environment. As a tentative proposal, I
would suggest ordering the ten top ranking states in each of these
five categories (or the three more easily quantifiable categories
if the latter two prove overly troublesome), assigning each state a
point value from ten to one as they decrease in rank from the
leader in each category, subsequently summing each state's performance in the selected areas, the total to be used as an index
of interest in seabed exploitation and thus as a qualifier for "big
six" membership on the Council. Any other method would be just
as acceptable, so long as factors relating more specifically to exploitation of the resources of the marine environment are included
and so long as reliance is not placed exclusively on the gross national product. Finally, if such a standard is used, I see no valid
reason for excluding developing countries from "big six" membership. It seems highly unlikely that a state qualifying among
the top six in such categories could conceivably be ranked by any
institution as "less developed," but even if that should be the case
it should not act as a bar to "big six" membership on the Council.
Assuming, however, adoption of the GNP formula, and based on
recent GNP figures, the "big six" would be the United States,
the Soviet Union, Japan, West Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom, provided all were parties to the Convention. Italy and
Canada would be numbers 7 and 8, respectively, and since their
GNP growth rates are substantially in excess of that of the United
Kingdom, they might be expected to overtake the latter for the
sixth position at sometime in the future. The People's Republic
of China ranks between the United Kingdom and Italy, but is not
considered a developed country by the United States Department of
State.
Article 40 sets forth the powers and duties of the Council among
the more important of which are (1) to appoint and supervise the
operations of the three standing Commissions, (2) to submit proposed budgets to the Assembly for its approval, (3) to submit
proposals to the Assembly for changes in the allocation of income
of the Authority, and (4) to adopt rules and practices for exploration and exploitation activities upon recommendation of the
Rules and Recommended Practices Commission.
The Tribunal. The Tribunal is authorized to decide all disputes and advise on all questions relating to the interpretation and
application of the Convention which have been submitted to it in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention.18 5 Article 50
135. Id., Art. 46 (1).
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permits any party to the Convention to bring a complaint before the
Tribunal if it feels that another party has failed to fulfill any of
its obligations under the Convention,' 8 6 thus providing a system of
compulsory dispute settlement. However, an exhaustion of remedies requirement necessitates that the complaining party first proceed before the Operations Commission, the latter being required
to deliver a written opinion on the matter, non-compliance with
which permits recourse to the Tribunal.137 In addition, the Operations Commission may itself (or on request of any licensee) proceed in similar fashion, first issuing a written opinion, against any
licensee or Contracting Party.388
Of substantial importance to
operating companies is the provision of Article 54 permitting a Contracting Party to bring any matter before the Tribunal concerning
the "legality of measures taken by the Council, the Rules and Recommended Practices Commission, the Operations Commission, or
the International Seabed Boundary Review Commission on the
grounds of a violation of [the] Convention, lack of jurisdiction, infringement of important procedural rules, unreasonableness, or
misuse of powers .... ." Thus an effective system is established
by which an adversely affected operating company may challenge
the validity of a particular obligation imposed upon it. This provides substantially more review over administrative procedures
than operating companies now have in the United States under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
The Commissions. Article 42 provides for a Rules and Recommended Practices Commission, an Operations Commission, and
an International Seabed Boundary Review Commission, each to be
composed of five to nine members appointed by the Council.
The obligations of the Rules and Recommended Practices Commission are to (1) recommend to the Council for adoption annexes
containing rules and recommended practices for seabed exploitation, (2) to collect and disseminate to the Contracting Parties
"information which the Commission considers necessary and useful in carrying out its functions. ' 38 a Details concerning the
establishment of rules and recommended practices are found in
136. Id., Art. 50 (1).
137. Id., Art. 50(2)- (5).
138. Id., Art. 51.
138a. Id., Art. 43 (2) (a) and (b).

Chapter V (Articles 66-72) of the Draft Convention. Such rules
are to be in the form of annexes to the Convention which are to
be approved by the Council upon recommendation of the Commission, and which become effective three months after submission of the Contracting Parties in the absence of disapproval registered by more than one-third of such parties. 3 0 Such annexes
may cover virtually every aspect of resources exploitation operations in the International Seabed Area. 140 Provision is made for
waivers from the application of such rules and recommended
practices in special circumstances, with appeal to the Tribunal
in cases of a failure by the Operations Commission to issue waiv41
ers.1
The Operations Commission is charged with responsibility for (1)
issuing licenses for activities in the non-trusteeship portion of the
International Seabed Area, and (2) supervising the operations in
the entire International Seabed Area in cooperation with the
42
Trustee or Sponsoring Party.
The International Seabed Boundary Review Commission is
charged with responsibility for reviewing boundaries (200 meter isobath, and continental margin) submitted to it by Contracting
Parties in accordance with Articles 1 and 26. The Commission
may make recommendations to the Contracting Parties on the subject of lateral offshore boundaries (see Article 30 on the system for
resolving this category of offshore boundary dispute), and may
also, at the request of a Contracting Party, "render advice on any
boundary question arising under this Convention.'

43

The Secretariat. The Draft Convention also authorizes a Secretariat for the Authority, being comprised of a Secretary General
and "such staff as the International Seabed Resource Authority
1 44
may require."'
Some criticism has been directed at the proposed Authority, principally on the grounds that it would become a "super-sovereignty"
which would be in the words of one group, "so vast as to make the
size of the United Nations pale by comparison."' 45 Although this
statement is somewhat overdrawn, a more valid point was made by
the same group noting that "[p] resent leasing activities beyond the
139. Id., Art. 67(e).
140. Id., Art. 68.
141. Id., Art. 72.
142. Id.
143. Id., Art. 45.
144. Id., Arts. 61-64.
145. Jackson-Allott-Metcalf-Bellmon letter of July 21, 1970, to Secretary
of State Rogers, criticism No. 6.
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200 meter depth limit could not generate sufficient revenues to begin to fund such an organization." Since here is at present no commercial production of any non-living resource beyond the 200 meter isobath one can hardly quarrel with the conclusion. However,
one assumes that the Authority would grow from modest proportions in response to increasing activity in the area under its jurisdiction and, indeed, the Draft Convention provides that in the
period before the Authority acquires income sufficient for the payAuthority may borrow funds
ment of administrative expenses "the
146
for the payment of those expenses."
There are a number of quite attractive features about the administrative regime as proposed, including: (1) the compulsory
dispute settlement provisions; (2) the administrative procedures
available through the Commissions for resolving daily problems of
operating in the International Seabed Area; and (3) the effective
control over the organization by technologically advanced states
through the composition and voting rules relating to the Council.
In negotiations on the structure of such an Authority, these features, at least, should be retained.
D. Rules ForResource Disposition.
The Draft Convention establishes three separate horizontal stratifications of ocean space for purposes of exploring and exploiting
the non-living resources of the seabed. The document would create
the International Seabed Area comprising "all areas of the seabed
and subsoil of the high seas seaward of the 200 meter isobath adjacent to the coast of continents and islands." 147 Further, the International Trusteeship Area would be established, being that part of
the International Seabed Area "comprising the continental or island margin" between the 200 meter isobath boundary and a line
drawn beyond the base of the continental slope "where the downward inclination of the surface of the seabed declines to a gradient
14
of 1:."'
Provision is also made in both Articles 1 and 26 for
146. Draft Convention, supranote 6, Art. 74(2).
147. Id., Art. 1(2).

148. Id., Art. 26 (1). The specific figure is omitted from the Draft Con-

vention but a note appended to the provision specifies that:

The precise gradient should be determined by technical experts,

taking into account, among other factors, ease of determination, the
need to avoid dual administration of single mineral deposits, and

a system analogous to straight baselines where irregularities transect either the 200 meter isobath boundary or the continental margin
boundary.
Some proposals, including that of the Commission on Marine
Science, Engineering and Resources, had suggested a depth-distance
criterion for establishment of the seaward boundary of the continental shelf, for example, 200 meters or 50 miles, whichever was
the farther seaward. Undersecretary Richardson explained the
selection of the depth only criterion before the Senate Outer Continental Shelf Subcommittee by stating that whereas other proposals provided only one boundary (between the area of exclusive
coastal state jurisdiction and an international area) and therefore
it was desired in those cases to have the line farther seaward for
protection of various national interests, the Nixon Proposal envisioned the trusteeship zone concept where interests of the
coastal state would be adequately safeguarded out to the edge
of the continental margin, there thus being no need for other
than a depth criterion. 1 49 This reply, of course, overlooks the fact
that the Commission's proposal also included an intermediate
zone concept virtually identical to that proposed in the Draft Convention. The selection of the 200 meter isobath as the boundary
seems to have been made on the basis of maximizing the area
from which revenues would be paid, in whole or in part, to the
Authority, consistent with the conflicting interests which had to
149a
be accomodated in adopting such a boundary.
The Article 1 and the Article 26 boundaries are to be established
by the following process: (1) Each party to the Convention
delineates its boundaries by straight baselines not exceeding 60
nautical miles in length following the general direction of the 200
meter isobath, in the case of the International Seabed Area, or the
edge of the continental margin, in the case of the Trusteeship Area;
(2) such parties must submit their boundary descriptions to the
the avoidance of including excessively large areas in the Inter-

national Trusteeship Area.
Cf. text acompanying note 29, supra indicating that a gradient less than

1:40 is generally taken as ending the continental slope and beginning the

deep ocean floor. Obviously the boundary under the Draft Convention will
be determined by more complex formulae.
149. Richardson Statement, supra note 97, at 433.
149a. Single line and intermediate zone proposals have not been the only
alternatives suggested. For an interesting option based on regional arrangements, see Goldie, Where is the Continental Shelf's Outer Boundary?
1 J. MAn
Envr
L. & Commnv. 461 (1970) and Goldie, The Continental Shelf's
Outer Boundary-A Postscript,2 J. MAmaTn L. & Comm.nv 173 (1970). See
also the various proposals identified in the text accompanying notes 10011, supra.
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International Seabed Boundary Review Commission within five
years after the entry into force of the Convention, for acceptance
by the Commission; and (3) boundaries not accepted by the Commission and not resolved by negotiation between the Commission
and the affected state within a year of the submission are to be resolved by the Tribunal. 150
Once these boundaries are established, the three zones of seabed
jurisdiction will consist of (1) the continental shelf area (landward
of the 200 meter isobath boundary), (2) the International Trusteeship Area (between the 200 meter isobath boundary and the continental margin boundary), and (3) that portion of the International Seabed Area beyond the Trusteeship Area (seaward of
the continental margin boundary). It should be noted that the
rights granted in each of these areas, whether by the Convention
on the Continental Shelf or the Draft Convention, relate primarily
to the exploration and exploitation of non-living resources of the
seabed and subsoil, and the division of other portions of ocean space
will depend on separate agreements (e.g., agreement on the breadth
of the territorial sea).
Different procedures for disposition of resources will be in effect in each of these three zones, the substance of those procedures
being analyzed in this section.
A side note is in order first, however, since the question of offshore boundaries must bring to mind, in the United States, the protracted litigation between the Federal government and the several
coastal states over boundaries separating the two jurisdictions in
the conduct of seabed exploitation on the continental shelf.1 51 It
150. Draft Convention, Arts. 1(3) and (4), 26(2) and (3). With respect
to Article 26 boundaries, the Draft Convention contains a note following
that article stating that: "Additional consideration will be given to problems raised by enclosed and semi-enclosed seas."
151. Probably the best short summary of the state-federal submerged
lands dispute is Swarth, Offshore Submerged Lands: An HistoricalSynopsis, 6 L~im um NATURAL REsoURcEs DiVrsIoN J. 109 (U.S. Dep't. of Justice)
(No. 3) (1968). See also Chapter 3, STUDY Or THE OuTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF LANDs OF THE UNITED STATES (Clearing House for Federal Scientific

& Technical Information, PB 188, 715 1968), at 122. At present, the coastal
states have title, by virtue of the Submerged Lands Act [43 U.S.C. §§ 130115 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of May 22, 1953, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29) ] to
submerged lands out to three geographical miles from the coastline (except
for Florida's Gulf Coast, and Texas, whose boundaries extend out three

is appropriate to consider what effects, if any, the regime proposed
by the Draft Convention might have on the ultimate disposition
of this controversy. It has been suggested that the Federal government might wish to reverse its past policy on straight baselines 52 and establish such lines in order to move the United
States boundary farther seaward and thus expand the area under
(1) exclusive United States jurisdiction or (2) United States trusteeship. 153 The Federal government has in the past resisted all
such suggestions as a matter of national policy although there are
areas of the Nation's coast (notably portions of the coasts of
Alaska, Louisiana, and Florida) which seems to fit the criteria established for such lines in the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone. 54 The Draft Convention gives no comfort to supporters of such a concept, however, since it does not
use any distance criteria in establishing boundaries for its zones of
offshore jurisdiction. Thus, nothing would be gained for the
United States under the Draft Convention by moving the baseline
seaward, since neither the 200 meter isobath boundary nor the continental margin boundary is dependent on the location of the baseline for its determination. 55
Of more importance may be the effect of the Draft Convention
on the question of regulation of oil and gas production from offmarine leagues) and the Federal government has jurisdiction seaward of
that line to the limit of national jurisdiction.
152. In both United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1964) and United
States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the option to use straight baselines (as permitted by the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (supra note 2, Art. 4)) rested excluswith the Federal government, and that individual states might not
therefore establish such baselines. This was in accord with the contention
of the Federal government in those cases that such power affected the conduct of foreign relations and must be vested exclusively in the executive
branch of the Federal government. Not so coincidentally, application of
that position also maximized the area of submerged lands under Federal
jurisdiction vis-A-vis the coastal states.
153. Moving the baseline from which zones of offshore jurisdiction are
measured has the same effect of expanding the area under exclusive coastal
state control as widening the breadth of such zones, and may be more easily
justified on the basis of existing customary or conventional international
law.
154. That Convention provides:
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut
into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate
points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. [Art. 41.
155. Other suggestions, notably that of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, provided for a combined depth-distance
criterion for these boundaries, such as 200 meters or 50 miles, whichever
is the farther seaward. See supra text accompanying note 149.
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shore areas by governmental authorities. Only the states of Texas
and Louisiana presently apply M.E.R. and marlat demand prorationing to offshore production, and their rules have in the past
also been extended to outer continental shelf lands off their
coasts which are under the general administration of the Federal
government. 1 6 On December 4, 1970, however, President Nixon
proposed to halt this extension of state jurisdiction by directing
the Department of the Interior to assume responsibility for conservation of and production of oil and gas on outer continental
shelf lands.' 5 7 The Draft Convention permits coastal states, in
their discretion, to establish prorationing in the Trusteeship
Area. 158 One effect of adoption of the Draft Convention provisions might be to strengthen United States resolve to administer
production restriction regulations on the outer continental shelf
itself, rather than relying on state initiatives, since the subject matter would now affect vital foreign policy interests of the nation,
not just the national economic interest in hydrocarbon production.
Any factor which will result in the Federal government reviewing
the subject of offshore prorationing with a view toward maximizing net resource or economic return (whichever priority seems most
crucial at the time) for the Nation as a whole, without great regard to either (1) protection of federal jurisdictional interests
against "creeping" state jurisdiction, or (2) temporary economic
dislocation in two coastal states, is a desirable one. Accordingly,
156. This was done with the tacit consent of the Federal government,
presumably through the delegated power of the Secretary of the Interior in
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to cooperate with the conservation
agencies of coastal states in the "enforcement of conservation laws, rules,
and regulations." Sec. 5(a) (1).
157. See WEEKLY COMPILATION O' PpRENTL& DOCumENTS, Monday,
Dec. 7, 1970 (Vol. 6, No. 49) 1623, 1626. The President there stated:
Up to now, State restrictions on production on Federal offshore
leases have held down the supply of crude oil.
I have been informed by the Director of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness that these State restrictions are not necessary for national security, moreover, they actually interfere with the freedom
of our domestic market system.
Consequently, I have today directed the Interior Department to
assume complete regulating responsibility for conservation and
production of oil and gas on all Federal offshore lands. This means
that more oil will be produced on those lands while maintaining
strict environmental standards.
158. Draft Convention, supra note 6, Appendix C, Sec. 8.1 ("The Trustee
Party may establish proration, to the extent permitted by its domestic
law.").

there seem to be no adverse effects stemming from the Draft Convention on either the state-federal offshore boundary dispute or the
question of jurisdiction to regulate offshore hydrocarbon production, and, indeed, perhaps some benefits on the latter issue.
1. Landward of the 200 Meter Isobath.
Since Article 1(2) of the Draft Convention provides that the International Seabed Area comprises all areas of seabed and subsoil
seaward of the 200 meter isobath, the Convention on the Continental Shelf should be amended to provide for a 200 meter isobath
limit on the shelf In such case, the Convention on the Continental
Shelf would remain the applicable international law in the area
landward of the 200 meter isobath.
In the absence of such amendment, complex problems would
arise concerning what legal definition of the extent of the shelf
(Convention on the Continental Shelf, or Draft Convention) would
be applicable in dispute resolution. The recently adopted Convention on the Law of Treaties15 9 contains in Article 30 rules on the
applicability of treaty provisions where a subsequent treaty on the
same subject is entered into by some or all of the parties to the
earlier treaty, but this convention itself may not be binding on all
of the parties to a dispute (of course, to the extent that the provisions of Article 30 reflect customary international law, all members of the international community would be bound thereby).
Since sovereign rights to exploit the natural resources of the
seabed on the continental shelf area are exclusive with the coastal
state,1 60 the state could apply any regime desired regarding exploration and exploitation of the seabed resources located thereon
consistent with the Convention on the Continental Shelf and other
applicable principles of international law. Presumably, however,
the problem of other (that is non-mineral resource exploitation'
uses of the continental shelf landward of the 200 meter isobath
would still exist. The proposition has been asserted that although
a coastal state may make whatever non-mineral resource exploitation use it wishes of the seabed and subsoil within its jurisdiction,
such user is not necessarily exclusive, since the theory upon which
it is based is res nuflius and since the exclusivity provided by the
Convention on the Continental Shelf relates only to exploitation
of mineral resources. One can also assimilate the concept of the
159. Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 22, 1969 (U.N. Doc. No.
A/CONF. 39/27), not yet in force (see text in 8 Int'l Legal Materials 679
(1969)).
160. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 2, Art. 2(2).
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high seas to the seabed beneath (which seems completely unjustified in view of the tremendous differences both in physical
characteristics of the two environments and the uses which can be
made thereof) and then conclude that there exists no body of law
governing such non-resource exploitation uses on the seabed unless
one might imply a test of reasonableness in use so as not to interfere with uses previously established by others. Under this position, the government of Mexico could establish or license an artificial island or floating airport outside the limits of the United States
territorial sea, but on its continental shelf, with the full protection
of international law. This view, however, is open to substantial
doubt insofar as the United States' shelf area is concerned as a result of the holding in United States v. Ray' 6' wherein the Court
found the "vital interests" of the United States in its continental
shelf, though short of the title required at common law to support
a trespass action, sufficient to warrant an injunction against the
threatened non-mineral resource exploitation activity. Clearly,
then, at least the United States judiciary (or a portion of it) regards
the right to make other than resource exploitation use of the continental shelf as being exclusive, or subject to a claim of exclusivity,
in the coastal state.
In view of the uncertainty surrounding this question, it would
seem appropriate to specify the circumstances under which coastal
states would be permitted to make non-resource exploitation uses
of their shelves at the same time the Convention is amended to pro0 2
vide for the fixed limit to the legal shelf.
As for the applicable regime, it is highly likely that the United
States will continue to apply the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act to that portion of the shelf under jurisdiction of the Federal
government (states' submerged lands granted pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 would continue to be administered by the
appropriate coastal states in the absence of amendment or repeal of
the Submerged Lands Act). Certain amendments will be necessary
in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act with respect to the Trus161. United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970).
162. For a discussion of the "other uses" problem and a proposed solution in terms of unilateral and international action, see Comment, Continental Shelf Law: Outdistanced by Science and Technology, 31 LA. L.
Rsv. 108 (1970).

teeship Area if that body of law is to be applied there, but these

amendments will not be necessary (or perhaps even desirable) in
the area landward of the 200 meter isobath. Accordingly, it is suggested, post, that a new act be adopted for the Trusteeship Area,
although it may be only a modified Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, in order to apply the most appropriate rules to the two areas
separately.
Finally, all revenues generated in the shelf area may be retained
by the coastal state or applied to any use deemed appropriate by
such state.
2.

The InternationalTrusteeship Area.

a. Preliminary Note. At the outset, a few comments about the
notion of the "trusteeship" concept are in order. The Commission
on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources made a similar proposal in its Report, calling the area an "intermediate zone," and giving the coastal states rights therein similar to those granted under
the Draft Convention. The selection of the terms "trustee" and
"trusteeship" has had, however, some unfortunate repercussions.
An early indication of dissatisfaction occurred at the Pacem in
Maribus Convocation in Malta, June-July, 1970, where the Nixon
Proposal was described by Professor Louis Sohn. Many representatives of less developed countries, particularly Mr. Duke E. Pollard
of Guyana, were concerned in the extreme that the ghost of colonialism was being resurrected in the form of the proposed international trusteeship. 163 The issue was further complicated by the insistence of many of the lawyers there present, also especially from
less developed countries, on a rigid interpretation of the term
"trustee" in terms of Anglo-American law, with all the implications
and complications of trust law. In order to clarify the issue, spokesmen for the United States Government have explained that: (1)
the coastal state is acting as trustee for the international community only in the sense of its responsibility to administer resource
exploitation in the area and to pay a portion of the revenue derived
therefrom to the Authority, and (2) the term "trustee" means
only what is specified in the Draft Convention concerning rights
and duties of trustee states and has no relation to the concept of
trusts in Anglo-American law. On the first point, Undersecretary
Richardson observed in his Senate Outer Continental Shelf Subcommittee testimony:
The term "trusteeship" implies a responsibility entrusted, and
163. See Proceedings of the Pacem In Maribus Convocation (prelim. ed.)
at 108-09 (1970).
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here the coastal state would be entrusted by the rest of the world
through the international regime with responsibilities, and so,
therefore, we thought it was a descriptive word in the sense that
it carried connotations
of a responsibility, exercised for the benefit
64
of all mankind.1
On the second point, Richardson noted that it was not the intent of

the drafters that the term "trustee" carry with it "all the specific
applications that attach to [it] under Anglo-American common

law."'1 65 State Department Legal Advisor John Stevenson elaborated further at the same hearing by noting:
[T]he treaty itself, which will be very carefully negotiated to reflect the responsibilities of the coastal state ... will be the guiding legal document here, and the terms of the coastal state's duties
will either be set out or delegated in the treaty itself.16 6

It is, therefore, clear that with respect to the trusteeship concept
no outside body of law need be referred to in administering the international regime or in settling disputes occurring with respect
thereto, but that the entire range of rights and obligations attaching to the notion of a "trustee state" will be established and defined
by the treaty itself.
The compromise nature of the trusteeship area concept and the
interests served thereby have been summarily noted above. Perhaps the most succinct statement of the necessity for such a system
was made by Lewis M. Alexander:
Any viable arrangements for the seabed beyond national limits,
be able to acquire at least some revenue from resource
exploitation within the span of a relatively few years. Such reve-

must ...

nue will probably come first from the development of resources of
the continental slope. Yet the legitimate interests of the coastal
state-including those involving wealth acquisition-must also
be protected in this area close to its shores. No proposal, except
one embodying an intermediate zone concept ...

can satisfy both

requirements. 67
Proponents of a "simpler" system for exploiting seabed resources
argue for a single line of demarcation between the "national" area
and the "international" area. The difficulty with such a proposal
is the requisite compromise-national interests desire the line fairly
164. Richardson Statement, supranote 97, at 434.
165. Id. at 435.
166. Stevenson Testimony, supra note 97, at 434.
167. Alexander, Alternative Regimes for the Continental Shelf, Preparatory Conference on the Legal Framework and Continental Shelf, Pacem In
Maribus Convocation,Jan. 30, 1970.

far seaward from the coast for (1) national security purposes and
(2) assurance of some economic return from development of offshore mineral resources; international interests desire the line
fairly close to the coast in order that meaningful amounts of revenue will be produced for disposition to developing countries in the
relatively near term. No adequate compromise of these two conflicting positions could be realized with a single line boundary.
Thus, as Alexander notes, the trusteeship zone concept permits
coastal states to have protection of security interests and to receive
a portion of revenues generated, while ensuring that the international community will also have some revenues at a reasonably
early date.
b. The Trusteeship System.

In the International Seabed Area

(which includes, of course, the International Trusteeship Area)
"[a] 11 exploration and exploitation activities ... shall be conducted
by a Contracting Party or group of Contracting Parties or natural
or juridical persons under its or their authority or sponsorship." 108
The issue involved here is whether operating companies may obtain
licenses directly from the Authority in the International Seabed
Area beyond the Trusteeship Area, or whether they will be required to go through states in order to acquire the privilege of operating in the area. The policy decision indicated by the Draft
Convention reflects the latter choice. The factors favoring establishment of such a policy include (1) effectiveness in identifying
the operator and determining its qualifications, (2) joint responsibility (operator and Sponsoring or Authorizing State) for the conduct of activities in the area, and (3) maximization of protection
for the Authority and the environment in connection with operations in the area. A negative factor is that the system may encourage "forum shopping" by operating companies seeking to secure the most favorable treatment by a particular state. In mitigation of this possible negative element it should be noted that
whatever the Sponsoring or Authorizing State, ultimate control
over operations to the extent necessary to compel adherence to the
rules in the Draft Convention still rests with the Authority, particularly in the non-trustee portion of the International Seabed
Area.
All activities relating to the exploration and exploitation of nonliving seabed resources in the International Seabed Area must be
licensed by the Authority or by the appropriate Trustee Party.10
168. Draft Convention, supra note 6, Art. 10.
169. Id., Art. 13.
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A "Trustee Party" is, a Contracting Party "exercising trusteeship functions in that part of the International Trusteeship Area
off its coast in accordance with Chapter II.''170 A State which licenses an operating company in its Trusteeship Area, or otherwise
authorizes any activity in the International Seabed Area, is known as
an "Authorizing Party," whereas a State sponsoring an operating
company's application for a license or permit before the Authority
171
is known as a "Sponsoring Party."
The Draft Convention states that except as specifically provided
"the coastal state shall have no greater rights in the International
72
Trusteeship Area off its coast than any other Contracting Party."'
The Draft Convention then gives Trustee Parties exclusive control
over the administration of the exploitation of seabed resources in
their respective Trusteeship Areas.' 7 3 Within the Trusteeship Area
the adjacent coastal state may apply any system of resource disposition so long as the same is not inconsistent with the general rules
of the Convention, and the Trustee Party is responsible for issuing,
suspending, and revoking mineral exploration and exploitation licenses as well as the other administrative obligations set forth in
Article 27. The Draft Convention provides that the Trustee Party
may, in its discretion:
a. Establish the procedures for issuing licenses;
b. Decide whether a license shall be issued;
c. Decide to whom a license shall be issued without regard to the
provisions of Article III [which provides that "the international
seabed area shall be open to use by all states, without discrimination, except as otherwise provided in this Convention]; ...
Such control was thought necessarily vested in the Trustee Parties
in order to avoid the difficult situation of a state being compelled
to issue licenses to a state or nationals of a state, conceivably in an
area only 12 miles from its coast, with whom it did not have
170. Id., Art. 75(2).
171. Id., Art. 75(3) and (4).
172. Id., Art. 27(1). The function of this proviso is to eliminate any residuum of authority in the coastal state and ensure that the only rights acquired in the Trusteeship Area by coastal states are those specifically
conveyed by the Draft Convention. This hopefully will eliminate "creeping
jurisdiction," the process by which coastal states supposedly expand the
nature of jurisdiction or control exercised over adjacent marine areas.
173. Id., Art. 27 (2).

friendly relations. Thus the right to discriminate against foreign
nationals, a concept embodied in the administration of the United
States outer continental shelf lands, 174 is made applicable to the
Trusteeship Area as well. Undersecretary Richardson explained the
this was possibly the most important of the powers of the Trustee
Party, observing:
It seems to us fairly self-evident that a coastal state would wish
to exercise the power of decision as to whether or not a license
should be granted to a particular applicant, having in view the national antecedents of the applicant; having in view the relations between the coastal state and the nation; and we have felt, therefore,
that to have proposed unilateral international control of such a decision as that 17would
go too far in overriding clear interests of the
5
coastal states.
In the case, as is likely to occur in some instances, that the appropriate Trustee Party is incapable either from the standpoint of technical competence or facilities to administer its Trusteeship Area,
Article 29 of the Draft Convention provides that such party may

enter into an agreement with the Authority under which the Authority will "perform some or all of the trusteeship supervisory and
administrative functions provided for

. . .

in return for an appro-

priate part of the trustee party's share of international fees and
royalties."
Appendix C sets forth the "Terms and Procedures for Licenses

in the International Trusteeship Area," noting that all provisions of
the Draft Convention except those in Appendix B (relating to
terms and procedures applicable to licenses in the International Seabed Area beyond the International Trusteeship Area) are applicable
to the International Trusteeship Area. Section 2.1 of Appendix C
provides that the Trustee Party "shall have the exclusive right, in
its discretion, to approve or disapprove applications for exploration
and exploitation licenses." Section 3.1 further provides that the
trustee party "may use any system for issuing and allocating exploration and exploitation licenses." Other provisions of Appendix
174. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act contains no definition of
the classes of entities competent to receive leases under the Act with respect to nationality, but the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
the Interior provide:
Mineral leases issued pursuant to section 8 of the act may be held
only by citizens of the United States over 21 years of age, associations of such citizens, States, political subdivisions of a State, or
private, public, or municipal corporations organized under the
laws of the United States or of any State or Territory thereof.
43 C.F.R. § 3380.1. Presumably it would be in the interest of the United
States to include a similar provision in the regulations affecting resource
disposition in the Trusteeship Area.
175. Richardson Statement, supra note 97, at 436.
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C call attention to the general obligations with which the trustee
party must comply, since such provisions are applicable to the entire International Seabed Area. Provisions are also included concerning unit management and proration.
As noted above 175a a Trustee Party may, to the extent provided
by its municipal law, apply prorationing to production from its
Trusteeship Area. This permits the coastal state to maintain requisite control over its internal economy insofar as the latter is affected by mineral production and to provide for efficient resource
recovery. Of course, prorationing was originally designed to permit maximum efficient recovery of a resource by limiting the
amount and location of production. However, in the United States,
market demand prorationing has also been used effectively to maintain the price of crude oil at a level sufficient to permit economic
operation of the oil industry and it is for such market stabilization
purposes as well as efficient resource production that prorationing
will ultimately be necessary with respect to mineral resources
produced from the International Seabed Area.
The United Nations Secretariat has nated in this regard:
Exploitation of the mineral resources of the sea-bed may also
have a favorable effect on the stability of raw material markets by
diversifying the sources of supply and, in some instances, easing the
excessive reliance of consumers on a limited number of producers.
At the same time, if exploitation takes place at a rate exceeding
that at which sea-bed minerals can be absorbed into the world
market, internationally agreed measures may be necessary to safeguard the interests of those developing countries which depend
heavily on mineral production in case this new source of supply
jeopardizes their markets or the price level for their exports [Citing "Economic Implications of the Exploitation of Mineral Resources on and Underlying the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor and its
Subsoil with Particular Reference to World Trade and Prices,"
U.N. Doc. No. A/AC. 135/14.176]

Since production from the International Seabed Area may have
deleterious effects upon the economies of single resource dependent
states, certain countries, Kuwait and Chile for example, raised seri175a. See section IIII) this article; text accompanying note 158, supra.
176. Possible Methods and Criteria for the Sharing by the International Community of Proceeds and other Benefits Derived from the Exploitation of the Resources of the Area Beyond National Jurisdiction,preliminary note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/24 (June 9, 1970),
at S.

ous questions about the desirability of a seabed regime whose object
is to promote development of resources. On December 17, 1970, the
General Assembly adopted, in addition to the two resolutions already discussed in this paper, resolution 2750A, 1'7 7 which:
Requests the Secretary-General to cooperate with the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, specialized agencies, and other competent organizations of the United Nations system in order to:
(a) Identify the problems arising from the production of certain minerals from the area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and examine the impact they will have on the economic
well being of the developing countries, in particular on prices of
mineral exports on the world market;
(b) Study these problems in the light of the scale of possible
exploitation of the seabed taking into account the world demand
for raw materials and the evolution of costs and prices;
(c) Propose effective solutions for dealing with these problems.

This report is to be submitted to the Seabed Committee during
one of its 1971 sessions. Such a study is a Brobdingnagian undertaking and it is not likely that any meaningful answers will be obtained during 1971. Neither is it likely that the quantity of production sufficient to have the type of adverse economic impact feared
will occur before the end of this decade. It is desirable in the interim that the United Nations and, when it comes into exitence, the
Authority, spend a substantial amount of time evaluating the eco-

nomic impact of seabed minerals on the world market structure.
The Trustee Party is obligated to forward a percentage of all fees,
royalties, and other income derived from resource exploration and
exploitation activities conducted in the Trusteeship Area to the Authority. The Draft Convention suggests forwarding between 50%
and 66-2/3% but this is, of course, a highly negotiable point. Section 9.1 of Appendix C permits the Trustee Party to collect fees
and payments in addition to those set forth in Draft Convention but
Section 9.2 requires it to transfer between 50% and 66-2/3% of such
additional fees to the Authority. Even though as noted the Trustee
Party has great latitude in authorizing and administering activities conducted in its Trusteeship Area, nonetheless such activities
must comply with the provisions of the Draft Convention, the appendices thereto, and any applicable annexes. To ensure compliance, Article 19 of the Draft Convention provides (1) that each state
is reponsible for regularly inspecting operations of its authorized or
sponsored parties and that such reports are to be submitted to the

Authority; and (2) that the Authority, on its own initiative or at
177. G.A. Res. 2750A, XXV (1970).
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the request of any interested party, "may inspect any licensed activity in cooperation with the Trustee Party or Sponsoring Party, as
appropriate, in order to ascertain that the licensed operation is
being conducted in accordance with this Convention." Thus, in the
Trusteeship Area, the Authority retains, inter alia, the power necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Draft Convention, even though the Trustee Party is the primary administrator.
Finally, Section 10.1 provides that the trustee party may "impose
higher operating, conservation, pollution, and safety standards
than those established by the Authority, and may impose additional sanctions in the case of violations of applicable standards."
Some concern has been expressed over the possibility that less developed countries might bring pressure to bear on technologically
advanced countries with broad shelf areas to develop the resources
of their respective Trusteeship Areas as part of an implied obligation (undertaken in becoming a party to the Draft Convention) to
maximize the revenue to be made available to the Authority. This
could have substantial adverse effects on the environment and the
economy in situations such as Santa Barbara Channel off the California coast where for one reason or another the United States Government might decide to withdraw from further leasing or exploitation activities large sections of what are known to be highly productive oil and gas producing areas. There is, however, nothing
within the four corners of the Draft Convention which would support this concern. Article 28 (b) specifically gives the Trustee Party
the discretionary power to decide whether or not a license shall be
issued at all within the Trusteeship Area; section 2.1 of Appendix C
gives the Trustee Party the exclusive, discretionary right to approve or disapprove any application for an exploration or exploitation license in the Trusteeship Area; and section 10.1 of Appendix
C authorizes the Trustee Party to impose higher conservation standards than those established by the Authority which conservation standards could logicaly include the creation of areas to be
withheld altogether from leasing. Secretary of State Rogers quite
specifically stated in response to questioning on this subject that
"the trustee nation would have the right to exclude either exploration or exploitation of the resources of the International Trustee-

ship Area.'1 7 1 Further, the Authority has the power to designate
portions of the International Seabed Area as international marine
parks and preserves where such areas have "unusual, educational,
scientific, or recreational value," and Article 25 further provides
that the establishment of such a park or preserve in the Trusteeship
Area "shall require the approval of the appropriate Trustee Party."
Thus, at least one mechanism is available for formally withdrawing
areas from disposition, although the Article 25 route would not be
the only method of effecting such a withdrawal. Certainly, there
would be nothing in the Draft Convention itself to prevent a less
developed country or group thereof from utilizing a forum such as
the United Nations to berate a technologically developed power for
taking such a step. However, in view of the effective control which
the leading technological powers will have over the Authority
through the composition and voting structure of the Council, and
the fact that it is the technology of those very nations who might be
subject to criticism which permits the revenue to be available to less
developed countries at all, it is unlikely that such pressures would
be publicly brought to bear. Even assuming that such was the
case, this would be a political question for resolution at the time
and should not deter the United States or any other technological
power from entering into the Draft Convention as presently proposed.
Of substantial importance is the regime which coastal states,
particularly the United States, might apply to their Trusteeship
Areas. Preliminary inquiries indicate that a simple extension of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, with the amendments required
by the provisions of the Draft Convention, is likely to be the approach taken in the United States. Two issues of importance are
raised by such an inquiry: first, what objectives are to be achieved
by the regime, and second, whether different regimes are appropriate for different resources. In view of the general policy overtones
of the Draft Convention, it is clear that a developmentally oriented
regime designed to maximize revenue for distribution by the Authority is planned for the non-trusteeship portion of the International Seabed Area.i 7 8a If a regime similar to that applicable in
the non-trusteeship portion of the International Seabed Area is to
be made applicable to the Trusteeship Area, the Draft Convention
objectives must also be consistent with United States policy objectives in that area. The Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources noted, ableit specifically with respect to hard
178. Rogers' Answers, supra note 114, at 467 (answer to Question No. 20).
178a. See section hID, 3 this article.
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minerals, the following desiderata:
The system should seek to encourage exploration.
The system's primary objective should not be to maximize nearterm Federal income from rents, royalties, or bonuses but rather the
aggregate net economic return to the nation from ocean mining
activity....
The system should take into account the fact that the United
States faces competition from other nations that may offer to lease
their offshore
mineral rights on terms more attractive to U.S.
79
capital.1

Accordingly, I suggest that the regime to be made applicable to the
United States' Trusteeship Area should also be designed to maximize development of the resources situated there and to the extent
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act does not afford a vehicle
for accomplishing this objective it should be amended or replaced.
As to the .requisites of the different mineral extraction industries, a good argument can be made for differentiating at least between petroleum and natural gas, and perhaps sulphur, on the one
hand, and hard minerals, on the other. 8 0 Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, competitive bidding is required for all
leases, no distinction being made between hydrocarbons and hard
minerals. L8
The hard mineral mining industry has made a case
concerning the inapplicability of the competitive bidding principle
with respect to offshore hard minerals, and their position was essentially adopted by the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources which observed that:
[OJnly a few types of hard mineral deposits extend from the
land offshore, making the projection of favorable target areas
much more difficult. Further, the exploratory techniques are
more expensive because the horizontal dimensions of most hard
mineral deposits are smaller [than fossil fuels]. The steps from
discovery to production of hard minerals also involved considerably
more effort [than fossil fuels] and,
except for nearshore operations,
involve new, costly technology.' 8 2
Some debate has centered around the question whether the absence
of offshore hard mineral activities in the United States is due to in179. Our Nation and the Sea, supra note 101, at 136.
180. See, e.g., Wilkey, The RoZe of Private Industry in the Deep Ocean,
SYmPosnnwr ON PRIVATS INVESTMENTS ABROAD, Sw. L. FouND (June, 1969).
181. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, supra note 116, sec. 8(a), (c),
and (e).
182. Our Nation and the Sea, supra note 101, at 133.

appropriate legislation (viz., the competitive bidding requirement
and other features of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act) or
simply the fact that such activities are not yet economically competitive with upland sources. The latter argument seems to be more
compelling, but there also seems no good reason to maintain a legislative system which only increases the margin between inaction and
economic feasibility.1 3 In this regard, the Commission recommended that:
[W]hen deemed necessary to stimulate exploration, the Secretary
of the Interior be granted the flexibility to award rights to develop
hard minerals on the outer continental shelf without requiring
competitive bidding ....184
Accordingly, whether or not the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act is amended as to the continental shelf area, amendment is
appropriate with respect to the Trusteeship Area. I suggest therefore that, at least with respect to hard minerals (and preferably as a
general regime for all minerals), the United States adopt new legislation applicable to the Trusteeship Area (perhaps the "Trusteeship Area Lands Act") which would contain provisions similar to
those in force for the non-trusteeship portion of the International
Seabed Area. In short, such a regime would permit non-exclusive
exploration activities not limited as to area but without preferential rights to exploitation, followed, upon proper application, by
exploitation licenses or leases, a portion of which would be relinquished upon attaining commercial production. If more than one
application is filed for a particular area, cash bonus competitive bidding would decide the recipient of the tract or tracts in question.
This system would provide a greater development initiative (particularly with respect to hard mineral mining activities) and should
result in discovery, and ultimately production, of more resources
183. It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate economic aspects of
offshore mineral production. The reader who wishes to review some of
the Congressional testimony by economists on this issue as related specifically to the seabed question should read Statement of Dr. Miller B.
Spangler, Outer Continental Shelf Hearings, Part 2, supra note 45a; Statement of Leonard L. Fischman, Consulting Economist, id. at 321; and Statement of Walter J. Mead, Professorof Economics, University of Californiaat
Santa Barbara,id. at 326. See also the many fine contributions on seabed
economic questions made by Francis T. Christy, including Alternative
Regimes for Marine Resources Underlying the High Seas, 1 NAT. RFs.
LAWYER (No. 2) 63 (1968), A Social Scientist Writes on Economic Criteria
for Rules Governing Exploitation of Deep Sea Minerals, 2 INT'L LAWYER 224
(1968), Marigeneous Minerals: Wealth, Regimes, and Factors of Decision,
in SY
osruM on THE INTENATiONAL REGME Or THE SEA-BED at 113
(Sztucki ed. 1970) and Economic Problems and Prospects for Exploitation of
the Resources of the Sea-Bed and its Subsoil, supra note 38a.
184. Our Nation and the Sea, supra note 101, at 137.

Draft U.N. Convention
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

than would be the case under the existing regime governing the
United States' outer continental shelf. In fact, just such a system
has been suggested by representatives of the United States Geological Surveyls 4a through a "four-stage" system for acquisition of
rights to exploit hard mineral resources. Stage one would consist
of a non-exclusive exploration permit to be issued pursuant to
Section 11 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act; stage two
would consist of competitive bidding for leases providing exclusive
rights for exploration; stage three would consist of the lessee exercising his right to convert from an exploratory lease to a development lease; and stage four would consist of the issuance of a mining production lease. According to its proponents, the system could
be effected under present Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act provisions and thus has the dual virtue of achieving the desired economic and resource objectives while not requiring new legislation
or extensive amendment of exiting legislation.
3. The InternationalSeabed Area Beyond the Trusteeship Area.
Three separate sections of the Draft Convention are applicable
to this area: (1) Chapter II of the text of the Convention, which
sets forth general rules applicable to the entire International Seabed Area, (2) Appendix A, setting forth terms and procedures applying to all licenses in the International Seabed Area, and (3) Appendix B specifying terms and procedures applying to licenses in
the International Trusteeship Area, beyond the International Trustee Area. It should be noted that items (1) and (2) above relate to
the Trusteeship Area as well as the area beyond and that in establishing the regime of its choice the Trustee Party must not contravene any of these provisions.
Section 1.1 of Appendix A provides that all exploration and exploitation operations "which have as their principal or ultimate
purpose the discovery or appraisal, and exploitation, of mineral deposits" are to be licensed. Presumably the qualifying language
"and exploitation" would exclude scientific research from the requirement of licensing, and indeed, Article 24 of the Draft Convention provides that each party to the Convention agrees to "en184a. Wayland, A Government View of Incentives for Outer Continental
Shelf Mining, Marine Technology Society, 6th Annual Conference Reprints
at 351, 356-58 (1970).

courage, and obviate interference with, scientific research." In addition, that article requires contracting parties to "promote international cooperation and scientific research concerning the International Seabed Area" through various means.18 5
Two categories of licenses may be issued as provided in Appendix A: (1) a non-exclusive exploration license authorizing geophysical and geo-chemical measurements, and bottom sampling,
which license is not restricted as to an area but which grants neither an exclusive right to exploration nor any preferential right in
applying for an exploitation license (such exploration licenses are
to be issued for two year terms and are renewable for successive
two year periods); (2) exclusive exploitation licenses authorizing
the exploration and exploitation of specified minerals in a designated area. Exploitation licenses include the exclusive right to undertake deep drilling operations which right (with one exception
to be noted later) can be granted only under an exploitation license. Exploitation licenses are issued for limited terms and expire
at the end of fifteen years if no commercial production is achieved.
Minerals are broken down into three categories in Section 5.1 of
Appendix A for specifications in exploitation licenses, category
one including fluids or minerals extracted in a fluid state, category
two including manganese-nodules and other surficial deposits, and
category three including other minerals (including manganese-oxide
nodules) occurring beneath the surface of the seabed, and metalliferous muds.
There is a third form of "quasi-license" consisting of an authorization for deep drilling for purposes other than exploration or exploitation of seabed minerals (that is, for scientific purposes).186
Individuals or companies are not permitted to acquire licenses directly from the Authority but must be authorized (referring to "a
Contracting Party authorizing any activity in the International Seabed Area, including a Trustee Party issuing exploration or exploi185. It is the view of the State Department that the Draft Convention

provisions would completely free the Trusteeship Area for scientific research: "The coastal nation would not be entitled to impose any restrictions
on scientific research in the trusteeship area." Rogers' Answers, supra
note 114 at 467 (answer to Question No. 21) (Emphasis added). Presumably
this means that even the consent of the coastal state would not have to be
secured in advance as is now the case under the Convention on the Continental Shelf (supra note 2, Art. 5 (8)). This is, of course, a situation
highly desired by the international scientific community. See Burke, Ma,rine Science Research and International Law, Occasional Paper No. 8, Law

of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island (Sept., 1970), especially
23-25.
186. Draft Convention, supra note 6, Appendix A, see Sec. 1.4.
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tation licenses"'187) or sponsored (referring to "a Contracting
Party which sponsors an application for a license or permit before
the International Seabed Resource Authority"'' 8 ) by a state party
to the Convention, which State is required to certify to the operator's financial and technical competence and which is responsible
for requiring the operator to conform to the rules, provisions, and
procedures set forth under the terms of the license issued. Fees
are payable for both exploration and exploitation licenses, a portion of which (again, 50-66-2/3% is suggested) is to be forwarded by
the Authorizing or Sponsoring Party to the Authority.
The maximum size of blocks under an exploitation license is to
be 500 square kilometers for fluids or minerals extracted in a fluid
state, three quarters of which area must be relinquished when production is commenced.18 9 A license may be issued for any area less
than the maximum 500 square kilometer area. Each block must be
the subject of a separate license, but licenses to a rectangle containing as many as 16 contiguous blocks may be taken out under a
single certificate. This same maximum area is also applicable to the
"other minerals" category but the relinquishment factor there is
seven-eighths of the total area of the block upon commencement of
production and exploitation licenses may be taken only to as many
as eight contiguous blocks under a single certificate. For surficial
deposits, the maximum block size is 40,000 square kilometers, to
be reduced by three-quarters at the commencement of production.
Licenses to only as many as four contiguous blocks may be taken
out under a single certificate. Section 5.8 provides that "commercial production shall be deemed to have commenced or to be maintained when the value at the site of minerals exploited is not less
than $100,000.00 per annum." Detailed rental fees and work requirements are also specified in Appendix A as well as provisions
relating to submission of work plans and data under exploitation
licenses prior to the commencement of commercial production; production plans and producing operations; unit operations; payments
on production plans and producing operations; unit operations; payments on production (specified as being equivalent to five to forty
187. Id., Art. 75(4).
188. Id., Art. 75(3).
189. Relinquishment does not apply to licenses issued for areas of onequarter of a block or less. Draft Convention, Appendix A, Sec. 5.3.

percent of the gross value at the site of oil and gas, and two to
twenty percent of the gross value at the site of other minerals);
graduation of payments according to environment and other factors;
liability and revocation.
For the area seaward of the International Trusteeship Area the
disposition rules are set forth in Appendix B. This procedure requires an applicant for an exploitation license to file a "notice of
intent to apply for a license"'190 accompanied by evidence of the deposit of the license fee, which notice of intent reserves the block specified for 180 days (notices of intent are not renewable). If only
one notice of intent has been received for a particular block at the
opening of such sealed notices, the applicant is granted a license in
accordance with the general terms of the Convention without further payment. If, however, more than one notice of intent is received at the same opening, notice is given to all such applicants
and their Sponsoring Parties, and, 180 days later, sealed bids to be
submitted on a cash bonus basis will be opened. Bidding is limited to the original applicants whose applications were received during the 180 day period following the filing of the first notice of intent. The term of the licenses in the area beyond the Trusteeship
Area, assuming commercial production is achieved within fifteen
years of the issuance of the license, is for a term of twenty years
renewable for one additional twenty year period on approval of the
Sponsoring Party. At the end of the forty year term, or earlier if
the license is voluntarily relinquished or expires, the areas to which
the license applied are to be offered for sale by competitive bidding
on a cash bonus basis and the previous licensee has no preferential
right to such area or any portion thereof. The provisions of Appendix B also contain details on work requirements and unit management.
Disclosure requirements are set forth in Appendix A governing
all International Seabed Area activities and require that licensees
(1) maintain records of drill logs,. geophysical data and other data
acquired in the area to which their license applies and (2) must
provide access to them to the Authorizing or Sponsoring Party on
request. 191 Further, at five year intervals or upon relinquishment
of rights to an area, operators must transmit to the Authorizing or
190. Such notices of intent may be filed directly with the Authority
without the necessity of securing a Sponsoring Party. However, when the
formal application for a license is made, a Sponsoring Party is required and
the notice of intent must be filed with the proposed Sponsoring Party at
the same time as transmittal to the Authority. Draft Convention, Appendix B, Sec. 3.2.
191. Draft Convention, supra note 6, Appendix A., Sec. 7.3.
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Sponsoring Party such "maps", seismic sections, logs, assays, or reports," as are specified in an Annex to be prepared by the Operations Comnmission. 192 Authorizing or Sponsoring Parties are reqired to hold such data in confidence for ten years after receipt but
are also required to make the data available upon request to the
Authority for its confidential use in the inspection of operations.1 93
Ten years after receipt by the Authorizing or Sponsoring Party to
such data, it is to be transmitted to the Authority and is to be made
194
available by the Authority for public inspection.
There are substantial differences of opinion concerning the disclosure of such data, especially interpretations of geophysical data,
and the value of such disclosure requirements. The oil and gas industry in the United States has strongly opposed disclosure requirements on the ground that such data, especially interpretation
of geophysical data, constitute the work product and trade secret
of the operator. Disclosure, the argument runs, could result in
"competitive injury to the lessee."'195 Further, the operators question the usefulness of such interpretative data in evaluating resource potential since there may be as many interpretations for a
given set of data as there are interpreters. Nonetheless, good arguments can be made, especially with respect to a new regime
which can authorize the requisite staff and financial resources for
such tasks from the outset, for maximum disclosure, and, indeed,
this is more the rule than the exception when one reviews offshore
mineral leasing administration systems around the world. It is, of
course, highly desirable for the lessor or vendor of a resource to
have at least as much knowledge about its value as the lessee or
vendee, and until the United States Government or the Authority
192. Id., Appendix A, Sec. 7.4.
193. Id.
194. Id., Appendix A, Sec. 7.5. An additional disclosure requirement is
contained in Appendix A, Sec. 1.4(e): "The applicant agrees to make available promptly the geologic information obtained from such [deep] drilling
to the Authority and the public." This requirement relates only to deep
drilling for purposes other than exploration or exploitation, i.e., scientific
research, conducted under a non-fee special drilling permit issued by the
Authority and does not affect operating companies' commercial deep drilling activities.
195. For the industry's position on this point, see Aitkens, The New Outer Continental Shelf Operations and Leaving Regulations and Oil and Gas
Lease Form, 3 NAT. REs. LAWYEa 298, 302-306 (1970).

goes into the marine resource evaluation business it simply must
rely principally on private sources for the data it needs in order to
ensure the public that market value, or something approaching that
0
elusive concept, is acquired for the disposition of the resource. 19
It should be noted that following the Santa Barbara Channel incident, increased disclosure requirements were imposed on companies' operations under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and
that there seems to be a general trend, for reasons of (1) environmental protection and (2) economic evaluation of potential resources, toward greater disclosure requirements.
The system of disposition applicable to the non-trustee portion of
the International Seabed Area, and which I have suggested be made
available also to the Trusteeship Area under United States trusteeship, is clearly designed to promote development of resources. This
is evidenced primarily by the large areas opened for exploration
and to be available under exclusive exploitation licenses. It has
been determined that the larger the area involved (and the more
capital available for exploration as well) the greater the chances of
securing a return on investment.197 Further, the non-competitive
situation where only a single notice of intent is filed permits acquisition of an exclusive exploitation license for a nominal license fee
rather than a huge cash bonus of the type which companies operating on the United States continental shelf have become accustomed to bidding and paying. Obviously, such a developmentally
oriented disposition system is advantageous where a principal objective of such system is the generation of energy sources. Clearly,
this is a motive of the drafters of the Draft Convention, for, as will
196. As a result of the Santa Barbara Channel oil spill incident, and
other factors, the United States Government is expanding substantially its
efforts to evaluate offshore areas for mineral potential. Obviously, however, the government cannot commit the funds necessary to a detailed evaluation of a specific small tract (or large number of the same) as can be
done by operating companies. Thus, disclosure requirements are necessary
in order to close the "information gap" between the lessor and lessee.
Although it would be absurd, under principles of free enterprise, to suggest that such be the case in a private transaction, we are here dealing with
a public resource and with a government charged with proper administration thereof. Accordingly, operations on the continental shelf or slope are
not and should not be conducted with the principal objective of maximizing
net profits to the operators, but rather of maximizing net social return
(bearing in mind the relationship between the two).
197. See, e.g., Harris and Euresty, A PreliminaryModel for the Economic
Appraisal of Regional Resources and Exploration Based Upon Geostatistical Analysis and Computer Simulation, 64 BumL. CoLo. ScHooL OF MINES
(No. 3) 71 (1969) in which studies are reported concluding that: "[Tihe
risk of not finding a deposit is negligible for the exploration of 1 million square kilometers, .05 for 100,000 square kilometers, and about .5 for
10,000 square kilometers. Id. at 73.
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be noted later, the providing of assistance to developing countries
can be done in large part by providing them with an assured
energy source. This is not to suggest that substantial revenues will
not be generated for the Authority, however, since the relinquishment provisions will permit remunerative cash bonus bidding
procedures where proven resources exist.
Finally, in both the Trusteeship Area as well as the area beyond,
primary responsibility for policing activities conducted lies with
the Authorizing or Sponsoring Party rather than the Authority.
For instance, Article 11 of the Draft Convention provides that
"[e] ach Contracting Party shall take appropriate measures to ensure that those conducting activities under its authority or sponsorship comply with this Convention" (para. 1); that each such
party make it an offense "for those conducting activities under its
authority or sponsorship in the International Seabed Area to violate the provisions of this Convention" (para. 2); that each such
party "be responsible for maintaining public order on manned installations and equipment operated by those authorized or sponsored by it" (para. 3); and that each such party is "responsible for
damages caused by activities which it authorizes or sponsors to any
other Contracting Party or its nationals" (para. 4). Thus the Authority will rely, in large measure, on Contracting Parties for the
day-to-day policing of activities in the International Seabed Area,
entering this aspect of administration only when the Contracting
Parties fail to carry out their Convention duties or obligations.
This, then, concludes the brief overview of the regimes applicable
to the International Seabed Area. Attention will now be turned
to two other facets of the proposed regime, revenue allocation and
interim provisions.
E. Distributionof Revenue.
Appendix D to the Draft Convention contains provisions relating
to the division of revenue to be derived from seabed exploitation
activities Section 1.1 limits disbursements to the net income of the
Authority except during the period before the Authority acquires
sufficient income for the payment of its own administrative expenses, in which case the Authority is authorized to borrow funds
for the payment of such administrative expenses. 198 The Council
198. Draft Convention, supra note 6, Art. 74(2).

is also charged with specifying in the budget to be submitted for approval by the Assembly what portion of the revenue is to be used
for the payment of administrative expenses of the Authority. 19
The operative provision of Appendix D is contained in Section 3.1
which provides that:
The net income, after administrative expenses, of the Authority
shall be used to promote the economic advancement of developing
States Parties to this Convention and for the purposes specified in
paragraph 2 of Article 5 and in other Articles of this Convention.
There are thus two principal objects in the allocation of revenue:
(1) economic assistance to developing states and (2) advancement
of research and knowledge concerning exploitation of seabed resources.
Article 5(1) provides with respect to the first object of distribution that:
The International Seabed Resource Authority shall use revenues it
derives from the exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the International Seabed Area for the benefit of all
mankind, particularly to promote the economic advancement of
developing States Parties to this Convention, irrespective of their
geographic location. Payments to the Authority shall be established at levels designed to ensure that they make a continuing
and substantial contribution to such economic advancement, bearing in mind the need to encourage investment in exploration and
exploitation and to foster efficient development of mineral resources.
Section 3.2 of Appendix D provides further:
The portion to be devoted to economic advancement of developing
states parties to this Convention shall be divided among the following international development organizations as follows: (NOTE a
list of international and regional development organizations should
be included here, indicating percentages assigned to each organization).
The intent of the framers of the Draft Convention would thus seem
to be to provide indirect rather than direct subsidies to developing
states and, if this is so, a number of issues are raised. First, since
Article 5(1) limits permissible recipients of Authority distributions

to developing states who are also parties to the Convention, some
problems may arise if the portion of income to be devoted to the
economic advancement of developing states is to be channeled
through international development organizations which are not
bound by the provisions of the Convention. For example, if the
Inter-American Development Bank 200 were to be recipient of some
portion of these funds and if Chile were not a party to the conven199. Id., Appendix D, § 2.1.
200. See Agreement Establishing the Inter-American

Development
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tion, it might be inconsistent with the purposes and principles of
the Inter-American Bank to exclude Chile or Chilean nationals
from the benefits which could be theirs under normal distribution
of Bank funds. 201 On the other hand, it would unduly burden the
Authority to make direct grants to developing states or their nationals, a function already well performed by international and
regional development agencies now in existence. The solution
would seem to require only that the international development
agencies understand clearly that distributions from allocations
made by the Authority must benefit only states or nationals of
states which are parties to the Convention and ensure that no institutional barriers to this policy are allowed to exist.
Second, and on a positive note, it seems clear that such a form of
distribution would provide a sounder avenue for raising the economic and industrial status of developing countries than the present system of competing distributions by major economic powers,
principally the United States and the Soviet Union. Presumably,
the funds distributed by the Authority would contain no strings,
and carry no political or ideological overtones, such as must always
be the case with grants from either of the two super powers (regardless of protestations to the contrary). Further, this system
should alleviate some of the strain placed on the economies of the
super powers since the goal of raising the level of industrial production in developing countries should now be achieved at the same
point in time with less demand on the United States and the Soviet Union than would be the case without the seabed regime.
This presumes, of course, that substantial revenues are generated
for disbursement by the Authority.
The second form of net income distribution is specified in Article
5(2) which provides that:
A portion of these reveues shall be used, through or in cooperation
with other international or regional organizations, to promote efficient, safe and economic exploitation of mineral resources of the
seabed; to promote research on means to protect the marine environment; to advance other international efforts designed to proBank, done April 8, 1959, [1959J 3 U.S.T. 3029, T.I.A.S. No. 4397, 389
U.N.T.S. 69, in force December 30, 1959.
201. It should be noted with respect to the Inter-American Development
Bank, however, that the Bank's loan authority is discretionary in that it
"may make or guarantee loans to any member." Id., Art. 3, § 4.

mote safe and efficient use of the marine environment; to promote
development of knowledge of the International Seabed Area; and to
provide technical assistance to Contracting Parties or their nationals for these purposes, without discrimination.

As noted above, it is the duty of the Council to submit to the As-

sembly proposals for the allocation of the income of the Authority
and it will be incumbent upon the Council to determine which avenue of distribution, Article 5(1) or Article 5(2), or in what percentages, will reap the greatest benefit for mankind. This will be no
easy decision. Secretary of State Rogers suggested that:
The promotion of the economic advancement of developing countries would clearly constitute a priority use for such funds, not only
because this represents one of the most important common objectives of all nations interested in peace and stability, but also to assure that states which may not themselves have the technological
capability or geographic position enabling them to derive direct
benefits from the exploitation of such resources will in fact receive
20 2
such benefits.

Notwithstanding these laudable objectives, I would suggest at the
outset that greater emphasis should be given to Article 5 (2) uses

since this should help to accelerate the pace at which substantial
amounts of revenue will be generated from the seabed and thus,
in the long run, maximize the amount of net income available for
distribution for Article 5 (1) purposes.
The revenue distribution provisions of the Draft Convention certainly raise some critical questions of political feasibility. Since
there is no veto in the Council and since at least three of the "big
six" states will be required to block affirmative action concerning

allocation of net income of the Authority, neither the United States
nor the Soviet Union can be absolutely assured of distributions
which promote their own national policies. The use of the veto
power in the United Nations Security Council has, of course, permitted both the United States and the Soviet Union to use the
United Nations as a forum for promotion of the national interests
of their respective states.20 3 Certainly it is desirable to avoid the
202. Rogers' Answers, supra note 114 at 464 (answer to Question No. 3).
203. See, e.g., Walton, After Many a Summer Dies the Majority, SATURDAY REVIEW MAGAZINE, June 27, 1970, at 19, suggesting that the U.S. and the

U.S.S.R. support the United Nations only at such times, respectively, as
they command sufficient allegiance from other members to control policy
decisions made by the Security Council or the General Assembly. It is
becoming clear now, particularly as evidenced by the attitudes and voting
patterns of the less developed countries on the seabed question, that neither
super power commands such an advantage. Certainly that should be the
case in any seabed regime adopted, provided however that sufficient control rests in a consortium of developed nations to ensure effective and efficient exploitation of the resources involved considering that they are the
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type of ineffectiveness created in Security Council operations by
the veto power, and the "big six" approach seems to be a suitable
compromise. However, in view of the fact that the remaining four
of the "big six" are likely to be Japan, Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom, 20 4 neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
can be assured of lining up two of those four states on a regular
basis. If anything, the lineup favors United States policy but with
recent developments in French foreign policy and the efforts of
Chancellor Brandt to bring about reconciliation between West Germany and Eastern Europe, not to mention pressures being placed
on Japan to abandon the United States as a military ally, there is
certainly no guarantee that the "big six" of the Council would be
an easily manipulated body. This, of course, is all to the good,
but precisely the lack of manipulative guarantees may cause
certain interest groups in both the United States and the Soviet
Union to urge their states not to become parties to the Convention
should it be adopted in the form proposed. Obviously, without the
participation of virtually all major technological powers and broad
shelf states, the Convention will be of dubious value. Such political questions can and should be analyzed in great detail by political
scientists between now and the time of the 1973 conference.
Perhaps the single strongest issue raised against the revenue distribution provisions of the Draft Convention is that it constitutes a
"give away" of national resources. 20 5 This is a doubtful assertion
at best and it can be demonstrated that no vested national interest
is being "given away" or even traded for other rights or advantages.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf, to which the United
States is a party, defines the portion of seabed and subsoil in which
contracting states have exclusive mineral resource exploitation
rights as extending to the 200 meter isobath "or, beyond that limit,
to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.

' 20 6

Since no

commercial production of non-living resources exists at present beyond the 200 meter isobath, 206 a and since the mere granting of exrepository of the technicological know-how which makes such exploita-

tion, and the revenues derived therefrom, possible.

204. See supra section II.C.
205. See, e.g., Ely Statement, S.3970 Hearings, supra note 66.
206. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 2, Art. 1.

206a. Living resources considered by at least some to fall within the

ploration permits alone could not conceivably meet the "exploitability" criterion of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 2° 0b
no interest in seabed resources beyond the 200 meter isobath has as
yet vested in any state party to the Continental Shelf Convention,
including the United States. At best such interest is an inchoate
right, in the nature of an inheritance, to vest on occurrance of a
condition. In fact, the position of many groups, including the
American Bar Association, is not that any such interest has vested
in the United States but rather that this Nation should stand on its
rights to acquire these interests under the exploitability criterion
of the Convention on the Continental Shelf rather than acceding
to an international regime such as that proposed in the Draft Convention. Thus the United States, in agreeing to the regime proposed in the Draft Convention, is simply exchanging an inchoate
right for a definite, present interest and could in no sense be said
to be "giving away" a vested National resource. The decision of
the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases 207 is often cited as authority for the proposition that a
coastal state's interest in seabed resources extends at present to
the edge of the continental margin by interpreting the notion of
"sedentary species" classification of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf are exploited beyond the 200 meter isobath (see Christy, Economic
Problems and Prospects for Exploitation of the Resources of the Sea-Bed
and Its Subsoil, supra note 38a.) The exploitability test has never been
successfully interpreted, however, and it is arguable that the extension of
jurisdiction based on that test should be on a resource by resource basis,
i.e., extension for oil and gas purposes to be determined only by exploitability of oil and gas, rather than oysters. It is upon such a premise that
I here assert lack of jurisdiction under the Convention on the Continental
Shelf beyond the 200 meter isobath.
206b. "Conceivably" is, admittedly, a strong word considering the lack
of agreement on exactly what meets the "admits of exploitability" test.
Clearly, actual exploitation is not required since this would render the
definition absurd (exploitation could not be attempted until exploitation
was achieved). However, "admits of exploitability" obviously means something more than the reflections of a petroleum geologist on the possibilities of commercial oil operations in particular water depths. Whether it
means something more than the granting of leases by the coastal state beyond the 200 meter isobath is debatable. See, e.g., Miron, The Outer Continental Shelf-Managing (or Mismanaging) its Resources, 2 J. MAunru
L. & Coivn. 267, 268 (1970) describing the position of the Department of
the Interior that United States jurisdiction extends at least to areas for
which permits or leases have been granted in the past. I would suggest
that the mere leasing of such areas alone does not meet the test of "admits
of exploitablity" since leases may be issued for a number of purposes (including claims of jurisdiction which may or may not be later upheld) and
may ultimately prove not to "admit of exploitation" (e.g., the only phosphate lease issued on the United States' outer continental shelf was abandoned when commercial feasibility could not be demonstrated).
207. Supra note 64.
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"natural prolongation" to include the entire continental margin, a
not unreasonable assertion in view of the geological phenomena involved. 208 This assertion overlooks two facts: (1) that the cited
statement in that case is dicta ,since the issue before the Court was
not the seaward extent of the continental shelf but rather the determination of principles applicable to delimitation of lateral shelf
boundaries between adjacent states; and (2) the proposition is
stated to be a rule of customary internationallaw from which derogation may be made by international agreement, an event which
has in fact happened in the form of the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 20 9 Thus, the United States is bound by the definition
of Article 1 of that Convention, and may not rely on a customary
rule of international law to the contrary, at least vis-a-vis other
states parties to the Convention. Following this argument, one
must then conclude that under the Convention on the Continental
Shelf no vested National interest in seabed resources exists beyond
the 200 meter isobath.
Assuming arguendo, however, a vested interest in resources to
be made subject to the international regime by the Draft Convention, is the United States even then engaged in a great "give away"
as urged by some? Certainly the trusteeship concept ensures that
the resources beyond the 200 meter isobath will themselves be subject to national disposal both as to policy on exploitation (when,
where, and by whom) and as to disposition once exploited. Thus
the United States will lose neither control over nor use of the energy
sources located in the area landward of the edge of the continental
margin, the broadest claim of national jurisdiction asserted today
by any reasonable interest group. Although no resources are being
"given away," the Draft Convention does require the states party
thereto to pay a portion (the Draft Convention suggests 50%66-2/3%) of payments (bonuses, license fees, royalties, etc.) received
by it to the Authority for disposition in accordance with the provi208. See supra text accompanying note 64, and Jennings, The Limits of

Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible Implications of the North for
Case Judgments, supra note 66.

209. This portion of the argument presumes, as is likely the case, that the

customary international legal principle of the doctrine of the continental
shelf is not a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is permitted. See Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note
159, Art. 53.

sions of the Draft Convention.

Operating companies are not af-

fected economically since this merely reflects the ultimate recipient of the payments they are now, and would be under any regime
adopted, obligated to make to the coastal state. The United States is
in fact contracting away a portion of the revenues it receives from
the Trusteeship Area, but will retain a sufficient amount so as not
to be out of pocket for administrative expenses. Thus, still assuming some present vested interest in resources beyond the 200 meter
isobath, the United States would be giving up only a right to receive
a portion of revenues derived from operations conducted in the
Trusteeship Area. But this is no "give away" for there is a significant quid pro quo. The United States will acquire benefits, both
direct and indirect, far in excess of the payments it is required to
make under the provisions of the Draft Convention. I have outlined such national benefits in the section of this paper entitled
"Summary of Interests Served by the Draft Convention Regime,"
and will not, therefore, set them forth here.
To conclude, then, the revenue disposition provisions of the Draft
Convention (1) will require no relinquishment of control over the
resources themselves by the coastal state, (2) will require no relinquishment of any presently vested interest, and (3) although
some limited inchoate rights are being given up, sufficient quid pro
quo is received to make the bargain one in the national interest.
F.

The TransitionProvisions.

The provisions of the Draft Convention on transition2 1 ° (i.e., the
time interval between the present and the date the Convention enters into force) had its genesis in the speech by which Ambassador
Pardo first raised the seabed question in the United Nations in August 1967.211 He expressed at that time the fear of his country that
increased technological competence might result in a race to grab
and hold the resources of the seabed, such an event being to the
detriment not only of developing countries but all mankind. It has
become increasingly clear over the past few years that many states
did indeed view the absence of effective international control over
extensions of maritime jurisdiction as creating an open season for
extending claims of territorial sovereignty far into the ocean, beyond any generally accepted or economically rational limits. In
addition, the ambiguous "exploitability" definition contained in

Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf seemed to some
210. Draft Convention,supra note 6, Art. 73.
211. Supra note 70.
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an ideal peg upon which to hang extensive claims of jurisdiction
over non-living seabed resources. Indeed, the United States Department of the Interior had, by 1970, issued leases in water depths far
beyond 200 meters. It was to forestall advances into the ocean
based not on rational economic principles but for political and industrial power purposes that many states supported the so-called
moratorium resolution 21 2 passed by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1969. As noted above, that resolution may
have had exactly the opposite effect from that intended by its supporters. In any event, it was clear to the drafters of the Draft Convention that a real problem existed considering the normal time
lag between the present and the date at which the Draft Convention
is likely to come into force.
If the Convention should be adopted in mid-1973, and assuming it
provides for 40 ratifications for entry into force including those of
the most industrially advanced nations (as suggested by Secretary
of State Rogers in his answers to questions propounded by the
Senate Outer Continental Shelf Subcommittee)

,213

it could be 1980

or beyond before the Convention enters into force. The four law
of the sea conventions adopted at Geneva in April 1958, required
only 22 ratifications for entry into force. Such entry into force occurred in September 1964 for the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone (6 years, plus), September 1962 for the Convention on the High Seas (4 years, plus), March 1966 for the Fishing Convention (8 years), and June 1964 for the Convention on the
Continental Shelf (6 years, plus). Thus an average of six years
expired before these international agreements became effective, the
earliest being more than four years from the date of adoption. In
response to the existence of this problem, President Nixon in his
statement of May 23, 1970, outlined an "interim policy" in the following terms:
I suggest that all permits for exploration and exploitation of the
seabeds beyond 200 meters be issued subject to the International
Regime to be agreed upon. The regime should accordingly include
due protection for the integrity of investments made in the interim
period. A substantial portion of the revenues derived by a state
from exploitation beyond 200 meters during this interim period
should be turned over to an appropriate internatonal development
212. Supra text accompanying and following note 95.
213. Rogers' Answers, supra note 114 at 466 (answer to Question No. 14.)

agency for assistance to developing countries. I would plan to seek
appropriate Congressional action to make such funds available as
soon as a sufficient number of other
214 states also indicate their willingness to join this interim policy.
The provisions of the Draft Convention on transition fall into two
categories: (1) authorizations to exploit mineral resources given
by contracting parties prior to July 1, 1970, and (2) such authorizations given after July 1, 1970. With respect to the former, the Convention provides that such authorizations are to be continued without change after the coming into force of the Convention provided
that "[a] ctivities pursuant to such authorization shall, to the extent
possible, be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention. '215 Further, new activities conducted under previous
authorizations begun after the entry into force of the Convention
are to be subject to the regulatory provisions of the Convention concerning "the protection of human life and safety and of marine environment and the avoidance of unjustifiable interference with
other uses of marine environment." 216 Finally, contracting parties
are obligated to "pay to the International Seabed Resource Authority, with respect to [pre-July 1, 1970] authorizations the production payments provided for under this Convention."2 1
The
question must be asked whether or not the United States can accede to such a concept under present constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory provisions affecting offshore mineral development. The
"to the extent possible" qualifier of Article 73 (2) (a), although not
relieving the United States or its licensees operating beyond the
200 meter isobath from legal liability under the Convention, nonetheless greatly lessens the standard to be met. It is entirely possible that provisions of internal law could be asserted here as vitiating
the obligation to conform to a particular rule or regulation ultimately embodied in a seabed convention, even though as a general
principle of international law municipal law may not be asserted as
a bar to performance of an international obligation. The determination of what is "possible", however, leaves a great deal of room
for unilateral interpretation, and it seems unlikely that the provision would be strictly construed by a third party decision maker
should the matter reach that stage of controversy. Thus, even
though the specific provisions of the seabed convention ultimately
to be agreed upon may not be known at the time such operations
are taking place, an admittedly troublesome point, it is highly im214. Nixon, United States Policy for the Seabed, supra note 113, at 738.
215. Draft Convention, Art. 73 (2) (a).
216. Id., Art. 73 (2) (b).
217. Id., Art. 73 (2) (d).
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probable that any substantial liability would attach to operations
licensed by the United States in its Trusteeship-Area-to-be. The
situation is clearly different with respect to "new activities" conducted under previous authorizations. Such "new activities"
would, I assume, include the drilling of new wells on existing oil
and gas leases. However, here the new regime applicable is limited
specifically to safety and multiple use considerations and it is likely
that United States standards would be higher in any event than
those requirements specified in the seabed convention. Nonetheless, the United States would, under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, have to make compensatory payments to its lessees
if the additionally imposed obligations required expenditures not
required or requireable by United States law. On the other hand,
it is within the power of the United States Government, and specifically, the Secretary of the Interior, to prescribe new regulations
concerning offshore operations, and it would be possible to encompass the safety and multiple use concepts of the Draft Convention
in new regulations prior to any operations authorization beyond
200 meters, to the extent they were not already incorporated in domestic law or regulations.
Finally, the revenue payment provisions of the pre-July 1, 1970
Draft Convention transition provisions raise some substantial problems. In the absence of an in-force seabed regime, and assuming
exploitation activities conducted beyond 200 meters pursuant to the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the United States would be obligated to make payments to the Authority which otherwise would have been made to
the Treasury of the United States. 218 Once the Draft Convention
enters into force, no amendment of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act would be required to effect this changeover in payee
since the Act is applicable only to:
[A]ll submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area
of lands beneath navigable water [granted to the states by the
Submerged Lands Act], and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to 219
the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and
control.

Since Articles 1 'and 2 of the Draft Convention would effectively
218. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, supra note 116, Sec. 1338.
219. Id., section 1331 (a).

remove any right or claim of appurtenance to the United States of
areas of seabed beyond the 200 meter isobath boundary the payment provisions of Article 9 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act would no longer be applicable to the beyond 200 meter isobath area. 220 On the other hand, until such time as the seabed convention enters into force for the United States, the Convention on
the Continental Shelf and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
still dictate payment of revenues to the United States Treasury.
Accordingly, an amendment of the Shelf Act would be required in
order to reflect the policy decision to make interim payments to
some international development agency or agencies. It is, in fact,
the Administration's position that Congressional approval would
be necessary for such interim payments and that the Administration
would not seek such Congressional approval in the first place unless it was assured that a satisfactory number of other countries
221
would agree to do likewise.
As to post-July 1, 1970, authorizations (but pre-entry into force of
the seabed convention) the Contracting Party must, notwithstanding prior issuance of a valid license or lease, acquire, or sponsor its
licensee in acquiring, new licenses pursuant to the Draft Convention provisions. 222 Although the Draft Convention notes that such
new licenses issued by a Trustee Party "shall include the same
terms and conditions as the previous authorization," it also provides that such licenses are not to be inconsistent with the Convention and that the Trustee Party itself is responsible for complying
with increased obligations. 223 Obviously, this will require a commitment on the part of the United States Government to subsidize any of its licensees to the extent that the obligations imposed
by the Draft Convention are greater than those imposed by the
United States under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in
areas seaward of the 200 meter isobath boundary.2 24 The Draft
Convention also provides that "[f]ive years after entry into force
220. However, in view of the vague and history shrouded nature of the
terms "jurisdiction and control," taken in conjunction with the rights of the
Trustee Parties in the Trusteeship Area, it would be advisable to amend
section 1331 (a) of the Act to reflect the new limitation on offshore lands
subject to United States jurisdiction.
221. Stevenson Testimony, supranote 97 at 447.
222. Draft Convention, Art. 73 (3).
223. Id.
224. Secretary of State Rogers correctly observed that "Eu~ntil a new
Convention enters into force, our authority [for issuing leases beyond the
200 meter isobath] would be based on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf and applicable principles of international law." Rogers'
Answers, supra note 114 at 465 (answer to Question No. 8).
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of this Convention all such [post-July 1, 1970] authorizations not
converted into new licenses... shall be null and void. ' 22 5 Should
this occur the United States Government would likely be liable to
its licensees for compensation at such time as the licenses were
declared null and void by the Authority because the United States
would be internationally bound by the provisions of the Convention and could not, under rules of international law, assert a provision of municipal law (the Fifth Amendment, e.g.) as a bar to fulfillment of an international obligation 226 The Draft Convention
recognizes this problem noting that:
Any contracting party that has authorized activities within the International Seabed Area after July 1, 1970, but before this Convention has entered into force for such party, shall compensate its
losses resulting from the application
licensees for any investment
227
of this Convention.
Some criticism has already been made of the transition provisions.
For instance, the Allott-Jackson-Metcalf-Bellmon letter of July 21,
1970, to Secretary of State Rogers observed that:
Article 73 would purport instantaneously to bind the Secretary of
the Interior in his administration of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act to impose such grieviously uncertain conditions on
Outer Shelf Leases issued after July 1, 1970, beyond a depth of 200
meters, so as to ensure a virtual moratorium on all such leasing.
No company could safely agree to entering into a lease under such
uncertain conditions. Further in this regard, it is argued that only
by an amendment of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act that
such a restriction be placed on the Secretary of the Interior with
respect to his present administration of outer shelf lands.
Two comments are in order with respect to the position of those
senators. First, it is highly questionable whether the conditions to
be imposed are so "grieviously uncertain" or that imposition of
225. Draft Convention, Art. 73 (5). If current conservative estimates of
expected commercial mining activities beyond the 200 meter isobath are
accurate (see, e.g., Christy, Economic Problems and Prospects for Exploitation of the Resources of the Sea-Bed and its Subsoil, supra note 38a), the
"transition" problem may be more academic than real. On this basis one
can make a de minimus argument in response to assertions of difficulty
with the concepts outlined in the Draft Convention on transition; this
would not, however, be a satisfactory answer if the result were to substantially discourage investment in the seabed area beyond the 200 meter
isobath.
226. See, e.g., Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 159, Art. 27.
Cf. Id., Article 46.
227. Draft Convention, supra note 6, Art. 73 (6).

those conditions would ensure a "virtual moratorium on all such
leasing." In the first place, it is highly probable that the conditions to be imposed will ultimately turn out to be quite close to
those posed in the Draft Convention. Secondly, the United States
Government must, under its constitutional obligation imposed by
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, stand behind its licensees
and compensate them for any additional obligations. This being the
case, the companies involved in offshore mining have an extremely
stable and well financed guarantor, and there is no reason why
they should be hesitant to move beyond the 200 meter isobath so
long as the Fifth Amendment remains unamended. Further,
there is simply no method to ensure maximization of the area under
an international regime and at the same time not prevent exploration for the next seven or eight years other than that proposed in
the Draft Convention. Finally, as noted in the May 23, 1970, Presidential speech, the decision has been made at the Presidential level
to condition all further permits or licenses granted by the United
States on offshore areas beyond 200 meters and also outside the
12 mile limit 228 as being subject to the international regime to be
adopted. In fact, this has already occurred in the case of an exploration permit granted to Deepsea Ventures, Inc. for its manganese nodule investigations on the Blake Plateau off the southeastern
coast of the United States.22sa
On the Senators' second point, it seems on the contrary clear
that an amendment of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act will
not be required in order to impose such conditions on licensees but
that such conditions could be imposed through the Secretary of In228. This assumes that agreement will be reached at the 1973 conference
on 12 miles as the width of the territorial sea. See the United States proposal to this effect in Stevenson, International Law and the Oceans, supra
note 60. This has substantial relevance for the United States since several
of the Santa Barbara Channel leases, portions of which are in water depths
in excess of 200 meters, are actually within the 12 mile limit and thus, under the package of agreements expected to come out of the 1973 Conference, would remain under the exclusive and absolute jurisdiction of the
United States.
228a. OCS Permit E 3-70 (letter of June 29, 1970 from H.A. DuPont
[Regional Oil and Gas Supervisor (Eastern Region), U.S. Geological Survey,
Department of the Interior] to J.E. Flipse [President, Deepsea Ventures,
Inc.]. The final paragraph of that permit provides:
In accordance with the policy statement of the President dated
May 23, 1970, exploration permits issued pursuant to Section 11 of
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 pertaining to areas
of the seabed beyond the depth of 200 meters are subject to the
provisions of any future treaty, regarding the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of these areas, to which the
United States is a party. Accordingly, this permit is subject to
the policy conditions incorporated in that statement.
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terior's discretionary power to promulgate regulations with respect
to outer continental shelf operations. Assuming that the Act continues to apply to operations beyond the 200 meter isobath during
the interim period, the Secretary of the Interior has discretionary
power to:
[A] dminister the provisions of this Act relating to the leasing of
the outer continental shelf, and [to] prescribe such rules and229regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

There would seem to be no impediment to the Secretary's promulgating a regulation requiring all permits and leases to be conditioned subject to the international regime to be agreed upon subsequently. Apparently, it was not felt necessary to take even this
step, however, as evidenced by the conditioning of the Deepsea
Ventures exploration permit.
In conclusion, the expected time lag between proposal and entry
into force of an implementing convention dictates that some interim
measures be adopted in order to avoid frustration of the effort.
Further, some good faith indication on the part of major technological powers is appropriate in view of the skepticism with which
the Draft Convention has been viewed by some developing countries. The proposed interim system provides an adequate response
to both these situations and would, therefore, seem to be in the best
national interest.
IV. INTERESTS SERVED By THE DRAn CoNvE

oN

Any proposed regime and attendant machinery to govern the exploitation of non-living resources of the seabed beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction must ultimately be examined in light of the
interests which it will serve. On the one hand, if the proper national, international, and industrial interests are not well served by
the Draft Convention, the document has little chance of ripening
into a binding international agreement. If, on the other hand, it
does serve such interests, then there is every likelihood that the
1973 Conference will produce an agreement not dissimilar to it. It
is, therefore, of importance to examine, however cursorily, the national, international, and industrial interests which would be served
by an international agreement containing provisions identical to or
229. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, supra note 116, sec. 5.

similar to those set forth in the Draft Convention. I suggest that
in balance the Draft Convention is in the national interest, in the
interest of the international community, and in the interest of the
hydrocarbon, natural gas, and hard mining mineral industries.
A.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST.

First, the revenue distribution provisions of the Draft Convention
will, assuming adequate income, assist in closing the gap between
the developed and the less developed countries of the world. This
is very much in the interest of the United States, for several reasons. It is our present policy to provide direct subsidies to developing countries in order to attempt to raise their economic and industrial bases. The revenue distribution provisions of the Draft
Convention are, therefore, consistent with present United States foreign policy with respect to foreign aid and would, indeed, reduce
the economic burden which we now bear in that regard. It should
be noted, however, that the proposed system of revenue disposition
is not viewed by the State Department as a part of the United States
foreign aid program per se:
The provision for the collection of revenues for international community purposes is not designed either as a foreign aid system or
as a substitute or supplement to a foreign aid system. It is designed to assure that funds will be available for international community purposes as a result of the exploitation of resources which
would be regarded as the common heritage of all mankind....
[TIhe system of international revenues is regarded as an integral

part of a general international settlement regarding rights and responsibilities in the seabeds, and is not a system of grants, gifts, or
other forms of foreign aid.230
In spite of this protestation, one cannot in all reality divorce the increased revenues to be made available by the Authority for assistance to developing countries from the quantity of United States
foreign aid to those same countries necessary to achieve the desired
political stability and rate of economic growth. Undersecretary
Richardson himself observed on this point that the Nixon Administration believes that "we should be moving progressively over
time in the direction of greater reliance on multilateral bodies in
the field of economic development and assistance."' 23 1 Further, economic disparity has throughout history been the source of great
trouble for mankind. It has been noted that "[t] he history of man
is the record of a hungry creature in search of food. '2

82

Since the

230. Rogers' Answers, supra note 114 at 464 (answer to Question

No. 3).

231. RichardsonStatement, supra note 97, at 447.
232. VAN LooN, THE STORY OF MANKaND (new ed., 1967), at 22.
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history of man has also been the record of a creature constantly at
war, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the closing of the economic gap may do much to strike at the roots of the causes of war
and thus serve the national interest in bringing about world peace.
Finally, the United States is the world leader as a producer of goods
and services and certainly has the capacity to expand this capability. It is, therefore, in the interest of industrial growth in the United
States to raise the economic and industrial levels of developing
countries so that they might also be markets for our products and
services.
Second, the framework envisioned will bring about order and stability in the oceans with respect to resource activities. It may also
serve as a model for further international cooperation, a goal suggested by Elizabeth Mann Borgese. 23s To refer again to Under Sec-

retary Richardson's testimony on the Nixon Proposal:
If we have no treaty governing the right of exploration and exploitation of the continental margin, we can anticipate a situation
in which coastal states progressively, over time, [claim] unilaterally wider and wider areas of exclusive
23 4 control not subject to any
international regulation or limitation.
Certain disorder and conflict will follow if no regime at all is

adopted and the resources are subject to appropriation by the first
to reduce them to possession. This is, of course, the situation at
present with respect to international fisheries, and no one is prepared to say that the existing system is adequate or has not resulted
in numerous and serious national conflicts. Such a so-called "flag

nation" system for exploiting the resources of the seabed also suffers from other defects, specifically the lack of security of investment, lack of dispute resolving mechanisms, lack of adequate safeguards for the environment, and a lack of benefit sharing by all nations of the world.234a
233. Borgese, Towards an International Ocean Regime, 5 Tsx. INT'L L.
FoRum 218, 234 (1969). See also Borgese, The Ocean Regime, supra note
102.
234. Richardson Statement, supra note 97 at 441.
234a. The most general weakness of the "flag-nation" proposal, however, is that it would reduce non-living seabed resources to essentially a
"common property resource" status as is presently the case with demersal
and pelagic fisheries. It is the inability in such a system to allocate rights,
limit entry, derive rent, and the like that makes the fishery industry an
uneconomic one. There would seem to be no excuse for imposing such a
"common property" system on a resource not normally or naturally requir-

*Third, adoption of the Draft Convention, sponsored as it was by
the United States, will greatly improve the U. S. posture (or profile) in world affairs, a posture which is at an exceedingly low level
at the present time. It is difficult to convince many of the less developed countries and, indeed, even some of our economically developed allies, of our good intentions with respect to mankind and
world order when we are embroiled in the Southeast Asia fiasco,
an almost unreasoning ideological warfare with the Soviet Union,
an intransigent position toward Communist China, and a general
military involvement in practically every area of the world. Here,
then, is an opportunity for the United States to go on record as
genuinely supporting the advancement of developing peoples and
indicating an unselfishness in managing the abundant resources
which are ours. Although I have suggested elsewhere that the
United States is not engaging in a "give away" of any dimension
in accepting a regime such as that proposed in the Draft Convention, nonetheless the United States has sufficient resources to be
quite generous with respect to these unappropriated resources of
submerged lands. Since the Draft Convention does not require us
to relinquish administrative control out to the edge of the continental margins, there seems to be little reason why we should not
be willing to give up (if, indeed, we have a vested right thereto at
all) a share of potential income from the area beyond 200 meters if
there is a strong probablity that this will reap benefits such as enhanced prestige and creditability in the international community.
Fourth, the development oriented provisions of the Draft Convention with respect to resource disposition should encourage exploration and production of seabed resources, thus ensuring a long term
supply of energy fuels for the Nation.
Fifth, it is clear that the United States is increasingly concerned,
from a military strategy standpoint, about the unilateral extension
of territorial claims into the ocean.23 4b Such claims have the potenhag it. See Christy, FisheriesGoals and the Rights of Property, 98 TRANS.
Am. FsH. Soc. (No. 2) 369 (1969); Gordon, The Economic Theory of a
Common-PropertyResource: The Fishery,62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
234b. On possible military uses of the seabed and the legal implications
thereof, see Breckner, Some Dimensions of Defense Interest in the Legal
Delimitations of the Continental Shelf, in THE LAW OF Tm SEA: NATiONAL
POLICY REconmNATIoNs (Alexander Ed. 1970) at 188; Craven, International Security on the Seabed, in THE LAw oF THE SEA: INTENATONAL
RULES AND ORGAxZATION FOR = SEA (Alexander Ed. 1969) at 414; Evensen, The Military Uses of the Deep Ocean Floor and its Subsoil-Present
and Future, in PROCEDINGS OF Tm Syawpos vt ON THE INTERNATIONAL
REGIME OF THE SEA-BED (Sztucki Ed. 1970) at 535; Frosch, Military Uses
of the Ocean, in PROCEEDImGS OF TE SECOND CoNFmm'Ec. ON LAW, ORGANIZATION AM SECURY IN USE OF THE OCEAN (Ohio State Univ., 1967) at 154.
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tial for obstructing free passage through international straits as
well as affecting the deployment of conventional military devices
on the seabed. The Draft Convention would limit exercise of exclusive coastal state jurisdiction for other than mineral exploitation
purposes to the twelve mile limit, since under both the Convention on the Continental Shelf (to the 200 meter isobath) and the
Draft Convention (to the continental margin boundary) exclusivity
is permitted only with respect to the exploitation of seabed resources and would not, therefore, act as a bar to other uses. The
basis for this assertion with respect to the Draft Convention is Article 3 which provides that "[t] he International Seabed Area shall be
open to use by all States, without discrimination, except as otherwise provided in this Convention." The Convention provides
"otherwise" only with respect to exploration and exploitation of
certain natural resources, presumably leaving all other uses to be
covered by the "open to use by all States" proviso of Article 3.234C
These, then, are some of the National interests served well by
the regime proposed in the Draft Convention. It would not suffice,
however, simply to establish a regime beneficial to technologically
advanced states if there were not concomitant advantages for the
international community as a whole.
B. INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS.
There are a number of interests of the international community
at large which will be served by the Draft Convention and which
should help ensure its adoption at the 1973 conference. Some of
these are coincident with the National interests noted above, particularly the establishment of world order with respect to the oceans
and the exploitation of seabed resources, and the additional revenue to be generated for the general support of developing countries.
Both of these elements have been discussed and will not be repeated
here. On the revenue distribution advantage, however, a question
234c. See also Draft U.N. Convention on the International Seabed
Area: U.S. Working Paper Submitted to U.N. Seabeds Committee, supra

note 6, at 210:
The rights of states to conduct activities other than exploration and
exploitation of natural resources in the International Trusteeship
Area and beyond would be expressly protected by the convention,
and the International Seabed Resource Authority would be empowered to adopt the additional rules necessary to protect these
other uses of the marine environment.

may be raised at this point why a developing country would be willing to settle for one-half to two-thirds of the revenue derived from
exploitation of resources from world shelves beyond the 200 meter
isobath when, by extending exclusive jurisdiction over its shelf out
to the edge of the continental margin, or beyond, it could have
all of the revenue derived from that area. The answer is to be
found in a quantification of values, admittedly a difficult proposition at this time. However, it should be noted that not all developing countries are coastal states, and not all of those that are
coastal states have any guarantee that abundant resources lie off
their own coasts. It therefore seems that the greater probability of
income to developiing states would be to take less than all of the
revenue derived from exploitation of resources in continental shelf
and slope areas where resources are known to exist as opposed to
gambling on possible production off their own coasts. Further,
even if developing or other states took the position that it was more
desirable to have all the revenues from extension of their own shelf
and slope areas, it is highly doubtful whether they could secure a
two-thirds majority necessary to adopt such a proposition at the
1973 Conference.
Beyond these reasons there are other significant advantages to
the international community.
First, the system proposed in the Draft Convention would guarantee access to and control over disposition of the energy resources
of submerged lands out to the edge of the continental margin. These
energy sources must be tapped and made available to the respective
developing countries if a substantial increase in industrialization is
to occur there. A system which would permit an international authority to have control over the ultimate destination of raw materials
beyond the 200 meter isobath would not be acceptable to less developed, or for that matter industrially advanced, nations for
the simple reason that it would limit the resources available exclusively to that state. The Draft Convention, however, guarantees
the requisite access and control, and therefore assists in lessening
the economic gap between rich and poor countries.
Second, another advantage for a significant portion of the international community was expressed by Legal Adviser Stevenson in
these words:
Maritime states' interest in freedom of navigation and other freedoms of the seas would be served by the limitation of coastal state
sovereign rights over the seabed to the point where the high seas
reach a depth of 200 meters. This will protect against the risk of
coastal state sovereign rights with respect to the seabed beyond a
depth of 200 meters expanding through the process of "creeping
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jurisdiction" to include sovereignty over the waters above. Since
all rights coastal states will have in the Trusteeship Area will be
specifically delegated in the convention and not derived from any
residual sovereignty,
there will be no basis for expanding jurisdictional claims. 235
Third, of great interest to the international scientific community
is the concept of absolutely free access for scientific research in the
entire International Seabed Area, a right conferred by the Draft
236
Convention.
Fourth, a distinct advantage to the international community
comes through the use of Authority revenues for Article 5(2) purposes, i.e., promotion of development of knowledge and providing
of technical assistance. It is only through transfer to less developed
countries of the technological and managerial methodology with
respect to seabed exploration activities that the third world can
avoid a United States hegemony over seabed activities. If ServanSchreiber is correct in his analysis of the "conquest" of Europe by
American managerial talent,237 the same "conquest" can happen in
the seas, either unilaterally or by a few technologically advanced
states acting in concert, with the attendant long-term disadvantages for the remainder of the world. As Servan-Schreiber observes, it is pleasant to have capital infusion and increased productivity, but unpleasant to have to rely eternally in a subservient
state on foreign "know-how" to maintain one's economy. Thus the
regime proposed, whether intentionally or not, provides a remedy
if the technology transfer also includes managerial methods and
is designed to ensure ultimate self-sufficiency on the part of less developed nations in the conduct of seabed operations.
C. INDUSTRY INTERESTS.
Naturally, none of these benefits to the Nation and the world
community can come about unless those industries technologically
capable of exploiting hydrocarbons, natural gas, and hard minerals on and beneath the seabed are willing to engage in such activities under the regime proposed by the Draft Convention. I submit
235. Id.
236. Draft Convention, supra note 6, Art. 24; see Richardson Statement,
Outer Continental Shelf Hearings,Part 2, at 450; and Burke, Marine Science
Research and International Law, supra note 185.
237. SERVAN-ScHR IER, THE AMERIcAN CaA.LNG. (1968), passim.

that the interests of industry are well served by the proposed regime.
First, the disposition provisions applicable to the non-trustee international area are quite developmentally oriented. As noted
above, they provide almost unlimited exploration rights and permit extremely large areas to be retained for exploitation purposes
until commercial production is achieved. In that sense, the Draft
Convention is not unlike early mining laws of the United States
which so greatly contributed to the mineral production and industrial and economic expansion of the United States during its frontier era. Obviously, the Authority will not acquire a great deal of
income during these developmental stages and the industries which
undertake these early exploration and exploitation activities will
receive a great economic boon if their efforts are successful. This
is not to suggest that the Authority is getting less than an adequate
break, for the requirement of relinquishment of a portion of the
area covered by exploitation licenses when commercial production
is achieved permits the Authority to relicense that area on a competitive bidding basis if the production appears attractive. In the
Trusteeship Area it is quite likely that most nations of the world
(probably all except the United States) will apply regimes similar
to that applicable in the non-trustee International Seabed Area for
the exploitation of the resources thereof. In fact, most nations' offshore mining laws now conform to that general pattern. If in the
United States the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act is extended to
cover the Trusteeship Area however, the interests of industry
should still be served since industry representatives have indicated
for a number of years, particularly to me and others connected
with the Study of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands of the United
States that they were well satisfied with the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act and its administration and did not see it as a deterrent to further offshore exploration and exploitation activities.237 a
Thus, under the proposed regime, the hydrocarbon industry particularly, and equally the hard mineral mining industry, should be
able to inexpensively discover great new reserves and to produce
substantial sources of energy from them.
Second, industry will be protected as never before from the threat
237a. See, e.g., the remarks of Meyers, Acquisition, Development and
Operation of Offshore Leases, with Particular Emphasis on Group Ownership, 20th Oil & Gas Inst. 203, 238 (1969):
(The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act] has worked rather well
insofar as the oil industry is concerned (and] it is safe to assume
that the industry will oppose any sweeping changes which would
in its opinion encumber the orderly exploration and development
of the outer continental shelf for oil and gas.
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of expropriation without payment of compensation. 238 The Council,
the effective policy making body of the Authority, will be composed
of states whose status guarantees that no such activities will be permitted or tolerated. Further, considering the makeup of the Council, it is not likely that the Authority will capriciously or arbitrarily
impose heavy royalty or other payment burdens on licensees operating in the international seabed area, as is often the case with individual countries when substantial reserves are discovered off
their coasts. Industry can, therefore, be assured of a stable regime
both politically and economically, in which to operate, something
which they do not now have off the coasts of many nations. This
stability should, of course, result in increased income to the producing companies.
Third, and as a generalization of the last mentioned advantage,
operating companies will be assured of a regime with none of the
uncertainties presently plaguing offshore development beyond the
200 meter isobath. As Under Secretary Richardson noted, there will,
under the Convention provisions, be "clear rules of the game under which [operating companies] would be in a position to be applicants for rights of exploration off the coast of other countries. ' 239
Fourth, the dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention should be extremely attractive to industry since the latter will
no longer be placed in the sometimes untenable position of negotiating directly with a foreign government. Their position will now be
argued by their national governments before the Tribunal and all
states will be bound by the decisions thereof, or by the Comnmission
decision if the administrative level decision is satisfactory to the
claiming party. This, too, should result in far more stability and
predictablity of operations than is the case where a company must
negotiate with a potentially capricious national government con240
cerning its offshore operations.
238. Draft Convention, Art. 20 provides:
1. Licenses issued pursuant to this Convention may be revoked
only for cause in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
2. Expropriation of investments made, or unjustifiable interference with operations conducted, pursuant to a license is prohibited.
239. Richardson Statement, supra note 9 at 450.
240. Although not agreeing with the international system proposed by
the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Melvin
Conant of the Government Relations Department of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) noted in 1968 the parameters for industry satisfaction

Thus it seems, on this analysis, that national, international, and
industry interests are well served by the Draft Convention, and that
the United States Government and the affected industries should
actively support its adoption at the 1973 Conference.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that there is much work to be done in the drafting and
negotiating process leading to the 1973 conference. It has been the
attempt of this paper to raise a few of the issues involved in the
concepts embodied in the Draft Convention and to indicate generally why the document is a basically good one for the Nation, the international community, and the offshore mining industry.

with a governmental system for administration of seabed resource exploitation:
[Tihe enterprise has its own reference points, based upon past experience, which help it judge the future; whether an investment is
made will depend upon the comparative attractiveness of one proposal weighed against others. Obviously where there is a set of dependable factors, e.g., long-term political and economic stability
(or development), mutual interest in the effective and efficient
development of the resource in question, and means for resolving
disputes which may arise, the prospect is good for reaching and
implementing agreement. The central observation must be that the
more "dependable" factors [which] can be enlisted in favor of a
major investment, the better the prospect of company interest
leading to engagement.
Conant, Industry's Needs-Political,in TnE LAw OF TnE SEA: INTERNATIONAL
RULEs AND ORGANIZATI ON FOR THE SEA (Alexander, ed. 1969) at 325. I suggest
that the Draft Convention offers industry the requisites stated by Mr.
Conant, viz., "long-term political and economic stability," "mutual interest
in the effective and efficient development of the resource," and "means for
resolving disputes." These are guaranteed, respectively, by the constituents and voting rules of the Council, the revenue sharing provisions, and
the Tribunal.

